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INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND THE RULE

OF LAW: BELMARSH, BOUMEDIENE,
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING IN ENGLAND
AND THE UNITED STATES
Douglas E. Edlin*
I. INTRODUCTION

Recent decisions of the United States federal courts and the
English House of Lords provide a timely opportunity to compare the
respective judicial responses to acts taken by the governments of the
United States and United Kingdom in the wake of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001.1 More specifically, I will examine
district court opinions, as well as the majority and dissenting
opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Boumediene,2 along with the United States Supreme
Court's extraordinary reversal of its initial denial of certiorari in that
case, 3 and the English House of Lords's decisions in A v. Secretary of

* Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Dickinson College. Harry
Pohlman's comments significantly improved this Article and I am grateful for them.
Responsibility for any mistakes is mine alone.
1. This is not to say that the situations of the United States and United Kingdom in relation
to the September 1Iattacks are identical. See generally Michel Rosenfeld, JudicialBalancing in
Times of Stress: Comparingthe American, British, and IsraeliApproaches to the War on Terror,

27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2079, 2095-3102 (2006) (contrasting the varying historical experiences,
factual circumstances, and legal conditions with respect to terrorism in the United States, the
United Kingdom and Israel).
2. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The D.C. Circuit consolidated
Boumediene with Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003). For the sake of

simplicity and consistency, I will continue to cite the consolidated cases as Boumediene, but I
should note that factual distinctions between the two cases might require differentiated evaluation
of the respective claims. I note some of these distinctions in my discussion and citations below.
3. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007), vacating 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007).

482

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol.41:481

State for the Home Department.' I will consider certain similarities

and points of contrast in English and American cases, focusing on
considerations of institutional relationship, judicial authority, and
maintenance of constitutional values.
This Article explores the contours of the common law
constitution and rule of law principles by comparing decisions of
English and American courts. Of course, the traditional view is that
English courts do not enjoy the same power of judicial review that
American federal courts do. The traditional view is that, unlike
federal courts in the United States, English courts cannot invalidate
primary legislation; judicial review in the English system is limited
to review of administrative agency actions to ensure compliance with
the authority delegated by Parliament. The reason for this limitation
on judicial review in England is the effort by British judges and
constitutional theorists to reconcile the exercise of judicial review
with the fundamental British constitutional doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty. On this account, the courts review agency actions to
effectuate the intentions of Parliament in creating and empowering
the agency.'
This traditional effort to reconcile judicial authority with
parliamentary supremacy is known as the ultra vires doctrine. 6 And
while the doctrine and current debate surrounding it are, in a sense,
the theoretical background to the discussion of this Article, they are
not the subject of the Article. I consider the decisions of the House
of Lords in relation to the English constitutional commitment to the
rule of law. I leave for another time the analysis of these cases in
relation to the ultra vires doctrine and parliamentary sovereignty.
By comparing the responses of English and American judges to
their governments' use of detention facilities as national security
measures following September 11, this Article attempts to contrast
the relative authority of English and United States courts within and
across their constitutional environments as a means of demonstrating
what is shared in the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, what
4. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't (No. 2) (Belmarsh II) [2005] UKHL 71 (appeal
taken from Eng.); A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't (Belmarsh 1) [2004] UKHL 56 (appeal
taken from Eng.).
5. See Mark Elliott, The Ultra Vires Doctrine in a ConstitutionalSetting: Still the Central
Principle of Administrative Law, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSTITUTION 83, 83-84
(Christopher Forsyth ed., 2000).
6. Id. at 95-96.
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differences might exist, and the occasional disconnect between what
judges actually do and what judges (and others) say they can do.
Moreover, I hope to illuminate the meaning of constitutionalism and
the courts' institutional responsibility to ensure that the governments
remain ruled by the laws of the constitution in the United Kingdom
and United States.
II.

THE UNITED STATES: HABEAS CORPUS, JURISDICTION-STRIPPING
AND INSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE

A. The DistrictCourt Opinions
Boumediene7 is the most recent statement in an ongoing
"conversation" 8 between the federal courts and Congress concerning
the scope of the President's and Congress's constitutional authority
to restrict access to the federal courts9 as a means of gathering
information and protecting national security during the ongoing
response to terrorist threats against the United States and its interests.
As this inter-institutional conversation relates specifically to the
Boumediene case, the two district court decisions that the D.C.
Circuit reviewed had reached conflicting results.'
The Boumediene petitioners are Algerian natives who
subsequently acquired Bosnian citizenship or permanent residency. 1
They were arrested by Bosnian authorities in October 2001 and were
to be released from custody, on January 17, 2002, by order of the
Supreme Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which determined that

7. Boumediene, 476 F.3d 981.

8. The quotation marks here are not intended as (entirely) tongue-in-cheek. Stepping back
from the immediacy and importance of the issues at stake, this conversation between the courts
and Congress is constitutionally healthy, desirable, and expected. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198 (1992) ("[Jludges play an
interdependent part in our democracy... [insofar as] [t]hey do not alone shape legal doctrine
but... they participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and with the people as
well.").
9. Of course, access to the federal courts is itself only one element of the governmental
response to terrorist threats. I restrict myself to this aspect of the federal government's response
in accordance with the thematic focus of this Article (and attendant space constraints).
10. 1 should mention that, in fact, this conversation began earlier. The D.C. Circuit's
opinion in Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), was reversed by the
Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). Space constraints necessitated that I begin
my discussion post-Rasul.

11. See Brief for the Petitioners at 1-2, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195 (Aug. 24, 2007).
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there was inadequate evidence against the petitioners. 2 Later, on
January 17, 2002, however, Bosnian police seized the petitioners
upon their release from a Sarajevo prison and transferred them to
U.S. military custody. U.S. forces then transferred the petitioners to
Guantanamo. 3
In both district court cases, the government moved for dismissal
of the petitioners' claims, arguing that non-resident aliens have no
constitutional rights of any kind and no statutory right to habeas
corpus. 4 As I will explain in this section, the district and circuit
court opinions in Boumediene ultimately raise questions about the
relationship between institutional authority and constitutional
principle. Although the decisions frequently speak in the language
of individual rights, as I will begin to discuss with respect to the
United States cases and as I conclude in my discussion of the House
of Lords decisions, whether conceived initially in terms of an
individual right to habeas corpus or liberty, these cases ultimately
should be addressed in terms of the institutional and constitutional
role and responsibility of the courts.
In Bournediene, the court granted the government's motion and
the case was dismissed. 5 The district court relied heavily on the
Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager6 and concluded
that the petitioners enjoyed no constitutional or statutory right to
habeas, because petitioners were aliens held at a military facility
outside the territory over which the United States exercises
sovereignty. 7 Moreover, the district court determined that nothing in
the Supreme Court's Rasul decision altered this analysis or result. 8
Interestingly, the district court viewed the Rasul decision as limited
to statutory habeas claims and interpreted this limitation as an
implicit endorsement of Eisentrager's9 holding that non-resident
12. Id. at 2.
13. Id.
14. The cases also raise issues of international law that I do not discuss here.
15. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
16. 339 U.S. 763, 770-71, 778 (1950), cited in Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 321
(D.D.C. 2005).
17. See Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 321-22.
18. Id. at 322-23 (discussing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)); see also Rasul, 542 U.S.
at 481 (holding that under the habeas statute non-resident aliens detained at Guantanamo had a
right to judicial review of the legality of their detention).
19. 339U.S.at781.
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aliens have no constitutional right to habeas. 20 This interpretation of
the Rasul Court's reading of Eisentragerseems to ignore the Court's
discussion of Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court" in Rasul:
In [Braden], this Court held, contrary to Ahrens, that the
prisoner's presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the
district court is not "an invariable prerequisite" to the
exercise of district court jurisdiction under the federal
habeas statute. Rather, because "the writ of habeas corpus
does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon
the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful
custody," a district court acts "within [its] respective
jurisdiction" within the meaning of § 2241 as long as "the
custodian can be reached by service of process." Braden
reasoned that its departure from the rule of Ahrens was
warranted in light of developments that "had a profound
impact on the continuing vitality of that decision." These
developments included, notably, decisions of this Court in
cases involving habeas petitioners "confined overseas (and
thus outside the territory of any district court)," in which
the Court "held, if only implicitly, that the petitioners'
absence from the district does not present a jurisdictional
obstacle to the consideration of the claim." Braden thus
established that Ahrens can no longer be viewed as
establishing "an inflexible jurisdictional rule," and is
strictly relevant only to the question of the appropriate
forum, not to whether the claim can be heard at all.
Because Braden overruled the statutory predicate to
Eisentrager's holding, Eisentrager plainly does not pre-

20. Id.; see Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23 ("Nothing in Rasul alters the holding
articulated in Eisentrager and its progeny. The Supreme Court majority in Rasul expressly
limited its inquiry to whether non-resident aliens detained at Guantanamo have a right to a
judicial review of the legality of their detention under the habeas statute, and, therefore, did not
concern itself with whether the petitioners had any independent constitutional rights. Indeed, the
Rasul majority went on to distinguish Eisentrager on grounds that Eisentrager was primarily
concerned with whether the prisoners had any constitutional rights that could be vindicated via a
writ of habeas corpus. Thus, by focusing on the petitioners' statutory right to file a writ of habeas
corpus, the Rasul majority left intact the holding in Eisentrager and its progeny." (citations
omitted)).
21. 410U.S.484(1973).
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clude the exercise of § 2241 jurisdiction over petitioners'
claims.22
The district court did not cite or discuss Braden (or its influence on
the Rasul decision) anywhere in its opinion.
In Al Odah, the government's motion was denied with respect to
the petitioners' due process claims. 23 Reading Rasul somewhat
differently from the district court in Boumediene, Judge Green
understood Rasul to hold that "[a]liens held at the base, no less than
American citizens, are entitled to invoke the federal courts' authority
under [the habeas statute]. 24 Judge Green also did not view the
Rasul decision as limited to statutory habeas claims:
[T]he majority opinion addressed two grounds upon which
a detainee traditionally could assert a right to habeas relief:
statutory and constitutional. The Rasul majority interpreted
Eisentrager to have focused primarily on the German
detainees' lack of a constitutional right to habeas review,
and distinguished the material facts upon which that portion
of the Eisentrager decision relied from the circumstances
concerning the Guantanamo Bay detainees. Among other
distinguishing facts, the Rasul opinion emphasized that the
Guantanamo Bay detainees were not citizens of countries
formally at war with the United States, denied committing
any war crimes or other violent acts, were never charged or
convicted of wrongdoing, and-most significant to the
present motion to dismiss-are imprisoned in "territory
over which the United States exercises exclusive
jurisdiction and control." Next, Rasul turned to the issue of
statutory habeasjurisdiction and ruled that post-Eisentrager
precedent required the recognition of statutory jurisdiction
even over cases brought by petitioners held outside the
territorial jurisdiction of any federal district court. [The

22. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Braden, 410 U.S. at 494-95, 497-500).
23. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 481 (D.D.C. 2005). The
district court also denied the government's motion regarding petitioners' Geneva Convention
claims. I do not discuss these claims here.
24. Id. at 449 (quoting Rasul, 542 U.S. at 481).
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Court noted] that the habeas statute made no distinction
between citizens and aliens held in federal custody .... 11
In addition to the striking instance of two judges on the same
court reading the same precedent in starkly different ways, the
district court opinions that the D.C. Circuit reviewed in Boumediene
also underscore the importance of considering how different judges
approach these cases in relation to different aspects of constitutional
meaning and institutional responsibility.
B. The ConversationBetween Congress and the Courts
In response to Rasul, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 ("DTA").26 The DTA amended the federal habeas
statute to include an ouster clause that read as follows:
Except as provided in section 1005 of the [DTA], no court,
justice, or judge [may exercise jurisdiction over] . . . an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf
of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or any other action against the
United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the
detention by the Department of Defense of an alien at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who... has been determined by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ... to have been properly detained as an
enemy combatant."
The attempt by Congress to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction
to consider habeas petitions and to deny the courts any authority to
review any government actions related to any individual detained as
28
an enemy combatant was an attempt to avoid the ruling in Rasul.
The Supreme Court then decided Hamdan.2 9 The government
argued that the DTA precluded jurisdiction over future and pending
habeas claims filed by detainees.3" The Court disagreed.3 ' Noting
25. Id. at 461 (citations omitted).
26. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd to -1

(2006)).
27. Detainee Treatment Act § 1005, 119 Stat. at 2742.
28. See Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 349
(2006).
29. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).

30. Id. at 2763.
31. Id. at 2764.
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the ordinary principle of statutory construction that "a negative
inference may be drawn from the exclusion of language from one
statutory provision that is included in other provisions of the same
statute,"3 2 the Court concluded that Congress must have intended to
differentiate subsections (e)(2) and (e)(3)-which applied explicitly
to pending cases-from subsection (e)(1)-which did not apply on
its terms to pending cases. 33 As a result, the Court held that the DTA
did not preclude its exercise of jurisdiction in that case, which was
pending at the time the DTA was enacted.34
Congress responded to Hamdan with the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 ("MCA").3 5 In the MCA, Congress amended the
jurisdiction-stripping provision that the DTA added to the habeas
statute:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by
or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who
has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting
such determination.
Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C.
801 note), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction
to hear or consider any other action against the United
States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention,
transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an
alien who is or was detained by the United States and has
been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.36
The MCA attempted to broaden the jurisdictional preclusions of
the DTA in four important respects.37 First, unlike the DTA ouster
32. Id. at 2765 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 2769.
34. Id.
35. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w
(2006)).
36. Id. § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2635-36.
37. I do not mean to suggest that these are the only meaningful ways the MCA altered the
DTA statutory scheme. For a discussion of some others, see Patrick 0. Gudridge, An AntiAuthoritarianConstitution? FourNotes, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1473, 1509-10, 1513 (2007).
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clause, which was limited to claims made by or in relation to
detainees held at Guantanamo, the MCA clause applied to any
habeas petition filed by any detainee designated as an enemy
combatant, wherever that individual was held. Second, unlike the
DTA clause, which was limited to aspects of detention at
Guantanamo, the MCA attempted to deprive federal courts of
jurisdiction over claims relating to detention by the United States
anywhere in the world. Third, unlike the DTA clause, which was
limited to claims arising from aspects of detention,38 the MCA
expanded the jurisdictional preclusion to any claims "relating to any
aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of
confinement."39 Finally, unlike the DTA, which empowered the D.C.
Circuit to ensure that an enemy combatant was "properly detained,"4
the MCA entrusted this authority to "the United States." 4 '
In addition to these increased restrictions on judicial authority to
review government action, the MCA sought to eliminate any
confusion concerning its applicability to pending as well as future
cases:
The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall
apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any
aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or
conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United
States since September 11, 2001.42
C. The D.C. Circuit Opinions
1. The Majority Opinion
Judge Randolph begins his majority opinion in Boumediene by
articulating the question raised on appeal: "Do federal courts have
jurisdiction over petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by aliens
38. Detainee Treatment Act § 1004(a).
39. Military Commissions Act § 7(a).
40. Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(c)(2)(A).
41. Military Commissions Act § 7(a). This change in the language does not prevent the D.C.
Circuit from engaging in the review of Combat Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") determinations
countenanced by the DTA.
42. Military Commissions Act § 7(b), 120 Stat. at 2634.
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captured abroad and detained as enemy combatants at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba?"43
Judge Randolph
interpreted the question of jurisdiction as a "constitutional issue" that
was reduced to "whether the MCA, in depriving the courts of
jurisdiction over the detainees' habeas petitions, violates the
Suspension Clause of the Constitution.. . ."" Judge Randolph then
cited his own opinion in Al Odah to support the conclusion that
Eisentrager was the controlling Supreme Court precedent in
Boumediene.45
Judge Randolph's reading of Eisentrager is
remarkable, given that the Supreme Court explicitly quoted Judge
Randolph's Al Odah opinion when expressing its conclusion that
Eisentragerdoes not preclude federal jurisdiction over the detainees'
habeas and other claims:
Eisentrager itself erects no bar to the exercise of federalcourt jurisdiction over the petitioners' habeas corpus
claims. It therefore certainly does not bar the exercise of
federal-court jurisdiction over claims that merely implicate
the "same category of laws listed in the habeas corpus
statute." But in any event, nothing in Eisentrageror in any
of our other cases categorically excludes aliens detained in
military custody outside the United States from the
"'privilege of litigation"' in U.S. courts.46
Whatever the reason for Judge Randolph's treatment of Eisentrager
in Boumediene, I am most interested in its relevance for his view of
the jurisdictional preclusion in Boumediene as a Suspension Clause
issue.
While there are historical links between the creation of military
commissions and the suspension of habeas corpus,47 and some
commentators have noted that deprivation of federal jurisdiction may
be tantamount to a suspension of habeas,4 these commentators also
43. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
44. Id. at 988.
45. Id. at 991 (citing Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1140-41 (D.C. Cir. 2003),
rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004)).
46. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 (quotingAl Odah, 321 F.3d at 1139).
47. See, e.g., Joseph C. Sweeney, Guantanamoand U.S. Law, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 673,
754 n.366 (2007) ("Authorization for military commission trials came indirectly through the 1862
statute dealing with the suspension of habeas corpus ....
(citation omitted)).
48. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and
Article 111, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497, 1552-53 (2007) ("Although the habeas-stripping provision of the
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conclude that, to the extent that the jurisdictional preclusion is read
to implicate the Suspension Clause, this actually weakens the
argument that the preclusion is constitutional.49 Moreover, the
Supreme Court's comments on the matter also indicate that a
statutory preclusion of jurisdiction to review government action in
habeas proceedings would not seem supportable on Suspension
Clause grounds."
Even assuming for purposes of discussion that the Suspension
Clause provides some constitutional basis for the congressional
deprivation of jurisdiction over the detainees' habeas petitions in
Boumediene, there are two further problems with this position. First,
and most obviously, by its own terms the Suspension Clause permits
Congress to suspend the writ only "when in [c]ases of [r]ebellion or
[i]nvasion the public [s]afety may require it."'" Therefore, any claim
that the jurisdictional ouster clause in the MCA (and DTA) is
justified by the Suspension Clause must demonstrate that Congress
enacted the MCA in direct response to an invasion, and that public
safety requires preclusion of judicial review of the detainees' habeas
Military Commissions Act may not implicate the Suspension Clause at all if the appellate remedy
provided for in the D.C. Circuit turns out to be meaningful and adequate, it may, particularly in
cases in which no appeal to the D.C. Circuit, let alone no meaningful appeal, is provided."
(footnotes omitted)).
49. Id. at 1553 ("[I]f the Suspension Clause is 'structural' along the lines of the jurisdictional
grants within Article III, it is difficult to conclude anything other than that non-citizens have
exactly the same 'right' of access to the writ of habeas corpus as citizens. After all, does the Bill
of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clause (which, like the Suspension Clause, appears in Article I,
Section 9) only apply to citizens? Certainly, Justice Scalia's position on the vitality of the
Suspension Clause in the latter (citizen) context is abundantly clear, as is the analogy to Justice
Douglas's concurrence in Hirota, and the notion that, because the writ must be available for
citizens, it must be available for non-citizens as well. This Article's broader argument about
Hirota and Article III may well suggest, then, that arguments against the constitutionality of the
Military Commissions Act on Suspension Clause grounds are on far sounder footing." (footnotes
omitted)). As Professor Vladeck points out, the D.C. Circuit's position is also that the detainees
have no due process rights whatsoever. If this position were accepted, the conclusion that the
MCA's jurisdictional preclusion is unconstitutional would amount to allowing the detainees to
appear in the D.C. Circuit just long enough for that court to tell them that they have no rights that
the court can recognize. See id. at 1553 n.286. For the D.C. Circuit's statements regarding the
detainees' lack of constitutional protections, see Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 991-92.
50. Cf INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304-05 (2001) ("In sum, even assuming that the
Suspension Clause protects only the writ as it existed in 1789, there is substantial evidence to
support the proposition that pure questions of law like the one raised by the respondent in this
case could have been answered in 1789 by a common-law judge with power to issue the writ of
habeas corpus. It necessarily follows that a serious Suspension Clause issue would be presented
if we were to accept the INS's submission that the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that power from
federal judges and provided no adequate substitute for its exercise." (citation omitted)).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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To be sure, the attacks on September 11, 2001, may

reasonably be understood as an invasion, but "[a]t some point, the
invasion as a predicate for suspension must lapse, '"52 and it is
incumbent upon Congress to justify in express terms the MCA's
ouster provision in accordance with the text and traditional
understanding of the Suspension Clause.
This leads directly to the second difficulty in trying to support
the preclusion of jurisdiction by reference to the Suspension Clause.

Given the threat that jurisdictional preclusion raises for rule of law
principles and for the institutional integrity of the judiciary, which is

heightened by the historical and constitutional importance of judicial
consideration of habeas claims, the federal courts have traditionally
required that Congress demonstrate its intention to preclude federal

jurisdiction over habeas petitions (and other constitutional claims)
with unmistakably clear statutory language. 3 Habeas jurisdiction
cannot be ousted by implication."
The heightened clarity in
statutory language necessary to establish a legislative intention to

oust federal jurisdiction in habeas cases (and over constitutional
questions more generally) has come to be known as the "'clearstatement' rule."55 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit itself has adopted this
more stringent test when evaluating assertions that Congress has
precluded judicial review of constitutional claims. 6 Consistent with
the development of the law regarding statutory preclusion of

jurisdiction over constitutional claims (including habeas cases), there

52. Tyler, supra note 28, at 389 n.295.
53. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298-99, 314; Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350 n.2
(2001); Richardson v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1311, 1316 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999); LaGuerre v. Reno, 164
F.3d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir. 1998); cf Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977) (referring to
"the well-established principle that when constitutional questions are in issue, the availability of
judicial review is presumed, and we will not read a statutory scheme to take the 'extraordinary'
step of foreclosing jurisdiction unless Congress' intent to do so is manifested by 'clear and
convincing' evidence." (citations omitted)).
54. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660 (1996) (discussing Ex parte Yerger, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868)).
55. See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is JurisdictionJurisdictional?,95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207, 1239
(2001) (citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298).
56. See, e.g., Ungar v. Smith, 667 F.2d 188, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("When, however, plaintiff
seeks to invoke the aid of the judicial branch on constitutional grounds, the Supreme Court and
this court have both indicated that only the clearest evocation of congressional intent to proscribe
judicial review of constitutional claims will suffice to overcome the presumption that the
Congress would not wish to court the constitutional dangers inherent in denying a forum in which
to argue that government action has injured interests that are protected by the Constitution.").
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is every reason to apply the clear statement rule in Boumediene and
other detainee cases:
Before honoring a suspension as displacing the habeas
remedy in these circumstances, the judiciary should require,
at a minimum, a clear statement from Congress setting forth
the justification for the suspension and its reach. Indeed,
given that the fundamental right to individual liberty is at
stake, a clear statement rule is entirely appropriate. Only by
requiring such a clear statement can the courts ensure that
Congress is not using its suspension power as a 'pretext' for
unconstitutionally depriving individuals of their liberty. A
clear statement norm in this context, moreover, ensures that
'the political process [has paid] attention to the
constitutional values at stake' and, by the same token, that
Congress appreciates the magnitude of the ramifications of
its actions.57

Applying the clear statement rule in these cases requires that
Congress must demonstrate, in the clearest possible terms, not just its
intention to preclude federal jurisdiction, but also its justification for
doing so in reliance upon the Suspension Clause. After all, if the
constitutional basis for depriving the federal courts of their
jurisdiction to hear the detainees' habeas petitions is that Congress is
exercising its power under the Suspension Clause, then the courts
must determine that the Clause's constitutional predicates of invasion
and public safety have been satisfied.58 The D.C. Circuit refers in its

57. Tyler, supra note 28, at 390 (footnotes omitted).
58. During oral argument in Harndan, there was a colloquy concerning the constitutional
validity of Congress unintentionally or implicitly suspending the writ. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 56-59, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184). More
specifically, Justice Stevens began this exchange by asking Solicitor General Paul Clement
whether ousting jurisdiction over habeas claims was tantamount to suspending the writ itself.
Solicitor General Clement stated during the discussion that, in his opinion, "if Congress...
stumbles upon a suspension of the writ, but the preconditions are satisfied, that would still be
constitutionally valid." Id. at 57. Justice Souter responded that "suspension of the writ ... is just
about the most stupendously significant act that the Congress of the United States can take" and
he seemed doubtful in the extreme that "Congress may validly suspend it inadvertently." Id. at
58. Justices Scalia and Ginsburg then joined in. The discussion is interesting in its own right,
and the question of whether the clear statement rule applies to acts of Congress under the
Suspension Clause is an issue the Court may have to determine, but for now I want to emphasize
that Solicitor General Clement assumed that the preconditions for suspension must always be
satisfied and Justice Scalia agreed that the acts of Congress must occur during "a state of
insurrection or invasion." Id. at 59. Accordingly, the courts always must first determine whether
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opinion to the textual prerequisites for congressional suspension,59
but the court never determined that Congress made any findings with
respect to invasion and public safety to support suspension of the
writ (and preclusion of federal jurisdiction).6" Although the D.C.
Circuit did not engage in this analysis to ascertain whether Congress
satisfied (or intended to satisfy) the constitutional prerequisites for
suspension of the writ via the MCA or the DTA, the district court did
perform this analysis in Hamdan.6
That court concluded that
Congress did not intend to suspend the writ when it enacted the
MCA.62 Whatever their conclusion about the matter, it is incumbent
upon the federal courts to make this affirmative determination about
congressional intentions, in accordance with the clear statement rule,
before acceding to any ouster of their jurisdiction over these habeas
claims. Anything less risks upsetting the constitutional allocation of
institutional responsibilities and frustrating the constitutional
protection of habeas corpus as a means of ensuring, through
individual petitions in independent courts, that the government act at
all times in accordance with the rule of law.
This last point is truly the crux of the matter here. At the end of
the day, the denial of federal jurisdiction over habeas claims brought
by Guantanamo detainees (or anyone else who might raise a
colorable claim that the government has violated the law)
inescapably raises the question of whether Congress can restrict the
federal courts' authority to review the legality of government
action.63 However it is articulated, and whatever the asserted
the invasion and public safety predicates have been met to evaluate the legitimacy of
congressional action restricting habeas jurisdiction under the Clause.
59. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 992 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
60. See id. at 995 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
61. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11-16 (D.D.C. 2006).
62. See id. at 14, 16 ("Congress has authorized executive suspension of the writ only four
times. All such suspensions were accompanied by clear statements expressing congressional
intent to suspend the writ and limiting the suspension to periods during which the predicate
conditions (rebellion or invasion) existed ....
Neither rebellion nor invasion was occurring at
the time the MCA was enacted. Indeed, Congress itself must not have thought that it was
,suspending' the writ with the enactment of the MCA, since it made no findings of the predicate
conditions ... " (citations omitted)).
63. To simplify the discussion, I refer to the denial of jurisdiction over habeas claims as the
functional impediment to assertion of claims against the government by detainees and as the
preclusion of judicial review of these claims. A separate question remains as to whether
Congress has afforded some adequate alternative avenue through which the detainees could assert
these claims in court. If Congress has provided this alternative process, then the denial of habeas,
standing alone, does not necessarily implicate the constitutional concerns discussed in the text.
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constitutional basis might be, the courts and Congress must decide
what their respective institutional boundaries are in this regard. This
is why Boumediene and the other detainee cases cannot ultimately be
resolved by determining whether Guantanamo Bay Naval Base sits
on land over which the United States exercises sovereignty, or which
instead is merely leased by the United States from the Cuban
government,' or by determining whether aliens possess the same
right of habeas corpus enjoyed by United States citizens.65
See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Applying the Suspension
Clause to Immigration Cases, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1082-84 (1998); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1366-67 (1953). The statutory provisions for limited review in the D.C.
Circuit might arguably provide this alternative to habeas review. See Detainee Treatment Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(2), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000dd to -1 (2006)). Although I cannot fully address this issue here, I have reservations about
whether the D.C. Circuit review provided by the MCA and DTA is an adequate alternative to
habeas for judicial review of detainee claims. For one thing, the statutes preclude any judicial
review of the government's treatment of detainees during their confinement. See Richard H.
Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,Substantive Rights, and the War on
Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2063 (2007). For evidence of the D.C. Circuit's efforts to
engage in review of CSRT proceedings under the DTA and MCA, see Bismullah v. Gates, Nos.
06-1197, 06-1397, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17255, at *8-'*10 (D.C. Cir. July 20, 2007). See also
Bismullah v. Gates, Nos. 06-1197, 06-1397, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18265 (D.C. Cir. July 30,
2007).
64. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471 ("The United States occupies the base, which
comprises 45 square miles of land and water along the southeast coast of Cuba, pursuant to a
1903 Lease Agreement executed with the newly independent Republic of Cuba in the aftermath
of the Spanish-American War. Under the agreement, 'the United States recognizes the
continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the [leased areas],' while
'the Republic of Cuba consents that during the period of the occupation by the United States...
the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control over and within said areas.' In
1934, the parties entered into a treaty providing that, absent an agreement to modify or abrogate
the lease, the lease would remain in effect '[s]o long as the United States of America shall not
abandon the ... naval station of Guantanamo."' (footnotes omitted)). I do not claim that this
issue is irrelevant; I do argue, however, that this issue alone cannot fully determine the outcome
because there are other issues that a court must consider, and myopic fixation on the question of
sovereignty over the parcel of land will unduly narrow a court's consideration of these other
issues.
65. For a discussion of the different approaches taken by the United Kingdom and the
United States regarding this issue, and an argument that the UK approach is actually more
consistent with Anglo-American constitutional principles than the current U.S. stance, see Neal
Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1392 (2007) ("[T]he experience
of Britain under the European Convention on Human Rights is far truer to our backbone of
equality than that of our own politicians under our own Constitution, who conveniently forget
about equality even on fundamental decisions such as who would face a military trial with the
death penalty at stake. Indeed, the United Kingdom reacted to the decision by adopting laws that
treated citizens and foreigners alike. Although our Founders broke away from Britain in part
because of the King's refusal to adhere to the basic proposition that 'all men are created equal,' it
is now Britain that is teaching us about the meaning of those words." (footnote omitted)). As the
discussion of the Belmarsh cases later in this Article indicates, it is not entirely accurate to say
that the UK adopted laws that treated citizens and foreigners alike. However, the House of Lords
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Of course, I do not mean to suggest that the answers to these
questions are unimportant. But the answers to these questions are
important only insofar as they help to illuminate the larger issue of
the operation of the Constitution vis-d-vis the United States
government's response to September 11. The Boumediene majority
viewed the question raised in that case as whether "federal courts

have jurisdiction over petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by
aliens captured abroad and detained as enemy combatants at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba?"66 By viewing this question
as falling under the rubric of the Suspension Clause, however, the

D.C. Circuit immediately frames the case as raising questions about
the scope of congressional authority. The question whether Congress
has the authority to deprive the federal courts of their jurisdiction

over habeas cases is approached as the question whether Congress
has the authority to suspend habeas corpus under these
circumstances.6 7 But this ignores the other half of the constitutional
equation: the role of the federal courts in ensuring that the
government's various responses to September 11 remain at all times
within the practical and principled boundaries of the Constitution.
The question cannot be approached in only one direction. It must
also be viewed in relation to the authority of the federal judiciary to
ensure that the rights of those detained by the United States are

has insisted that English and EU law require Parliament to do so (in these circumstances). See
infra notes 141-142 and accompanying text. Moreover, and more specifically responsive to the
approach of some federal courts that have fixated on the question of whether aliens and citizens
enjoy the same ability to invoke habeas corpus, the House of Lords rejected this differentiation
unequivocally in its Belmarsh I ruling:
Habeas corpus protection is often expressed as limited to 'British subjects.' Is it really
limited to British nationals? Suffice it to say that the case law has given an emphatic
'no' to the question. Every person within the jurisdiction enjoys the equal protection
of our laws. There is no distinction between British nationals and others. He who is
subject to English law is entitled to its protection .... There is nothing here to
encourage in the case of aliens or non-patrials the implication of words excluding the
judicial review our law normally accords to those whose liberty is infringed.
A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't (Belmarsh 1) [2004] UKHL 56, [48] (appeal taken from
Eng.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Khawaja v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't,
[1984] A.C. 74, 111-12 (appeal taken from Eng.)). David D. Cole maintains that this principle
applies under United States law as well. See David D. Cole, Against Citizenship as a Predicate
for Basic Rights, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2547-48 (2007) (arguing that citizenship was
irrelevant to the Court's decision in Hamdi and favoring the House's approach in Belmarsh I).
66. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
67. Id. at 988.
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recognized and protected in accordance with the law of the United
States.68
Ultimately, the questions raised by Boumediene, Rasul,
Hamdan, Hamdi, and the other cases engendered by the response of
the United States to the attacks of September 11, can only be
resolved through a process-a conversation-through which the
courts and the legislature define the contours of constitutional
government action. Sometimes, this conversation will take the form
of a disagreement. And sometimes this disagreement will involve
strident, even harsh, tones and phrases. That is to be expected. The
central flaw in the D.C. Circuit's Boumediene majority opinion is
that it fails to consider the questions raised in that case as
encompassing the constitutional relationship between legislative and
judicial authority. Fundamentally, the issues raised concern the
constitutional commitment of the United States to the rule of law
during a time of political turbulence and uncertainty.
2. The Dissenting Opinion
In her dissenting opinion in Boumediene, Judge Rogers begins
by disagreeing with the majority's characterization of the Suspension
Clause itself.69 According to Judge Rogers, the Suspension Clause
functions to restrain legislative power from potential abuse; the
Clause was not, and is not, intended to create individual rights, and
courts should not interpret the Clause as dependent upon or
equivalent to the content of individual rights.7" Judge Rogers
explains that the Suspension Clause should be read structurally in
68. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778-79 (1991).
69. 476 F.3d at 994 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 994-95 ("[T]he court fundamentally misconstrues the nature of suspension: Far
from conferring an individual right that might pertain only to persons substantially connected to
The
the United States, the Suspension Clause is a limitation on the powers of Congress ....
court holds that Congress may suspend habeas corpus as to the detainees because they have no
individual rights under the Constitution. It is unclear where the court finds that the limit on
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is an individual entitlement. The Suspension Clause itself
makes no reference to citizens or even persons." (citations omitted)); see also id. at 997 ("The
court appears to believe that the Suspension Clause is just like the constitutional amendments that
form the Bill of Rights. It is a truism, of course, that individual rights like those found in the first
ten amendments work to limit Congress. However, individual rights are merely a subset of those
matters that constrain the legislature. These two sets cannot be understood as coextensive unless
the court is prepared to recognize such awkward individual rights as Commerce Clause

rights ....

(footnote and citation omitted)).
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relation to the attainder and ex post facto prohibitions in Article I,
Section 9, which were deliberately juxtaposed with the Suspension
Clause in the constitutional text, because all of these clauses
establish preemptive restrictions on the exercise of legislative
authority.7 1

Judge Rogers then considers whether the writ of habeas corpus,
as it existed in 1789, would have been available to the Guantanamo
detainees.
This inquiry appears necessary because of a line of
Supreme Court decisions holding that "at the absolute minimum, the
' 73
Suspension Clause protects the writ 'as it existed in 1789.'
Although other precedent indicates that the Suspension Clause
should be interpreted to protect the writ as it has developed since the

eighteenth century,74 it seems inarguable that, at a minimum, the
Constitution incorporated the writ as it existed in English law at the
time of constitutional ratification, 75 and the courts must interpret the
Suspension Clause to protect the writ as it was incorporated in the

Constitution.
Judge Rogers concludes that, even as it existed in 1789, the writ
would have been available to detainees held in a facility such as
Guantanamo. 76 Relying principally on the Supreme Court's opinion

in Rasul, together with a close reading of English precedent in force
in 1789, Judge Rogers decided that the detainees were entitled to

seek judicial review of the legality of their detention.77
Judge Rogers then addressed the issue of a viable alternative to
habeas for the detainees.7 ' As I discussed above, Congress may limit
71. See id. at 996-98; see infra note 91.
72. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 1000-04.
73. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 66364 (1996)). It is worth noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Felker (for a unanimous
Court) was actually "that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ as it exists
today, rather than as it existed in 1789." Felker, 518 U.S. at 664. The notion that the Suspension
Clause should be interpreted in relation to the law in 1789 appears to originate in a concurring
opinion of Chief Justice Burger. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) ("The sweep of the Suspension Clause must be measured by reference to the
intention of the Framers and their understanding of what the writ of habeas corpus meant at the
time the Constitution was drafted.").
74. In addition to Felker itself on this point, see, for example, Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart,
118 F.3d 628, 631 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997).
75. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
76. See Bounediene, 476 F.3d at 1002 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1000-04.
78. Id. at 1000-07.
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or remove access to habeas so long as some meaningful alternative is
afforded to permit those confined by the government to challenge
their detention in a neutral forum.79 After reviewing the three
situations in which the Supreme Court decided that an alternative to
habeas was satisfactory," Judge Rogers decided that the Combatant
Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") hearings afforded to detainees
under the DTA and the MCA, as well as review of these hearings in
her own court, are inadequate substitutes for habeas review for at
least four reasons: (1) the CSRT places the burden of demonstrating
the illegality of detention on the detainee without providing him with
the basis of his detention or the assistance of counsel;8 (2) the
military judges who preside over the CSRT hearings are subject to
command influence;82 (3) review of CSRT hearings in the D.C.
Circuit does not allow the detainees to present evidence to contest
the government's case;8 3 and (4) the D.C. Circuit cannot review
evidence presented against a detainee in a CSRT hearing to
determine if it was obtained through torture.84
According to Judge Rogers, the analysis in Boumediene
proceeds this way: (1) Did Congress suspend the writ of habeas
corpus in circumstances where it would have been available in 1789?
(2) If so, has Congress provided a satisfactory alternative process for
judicial review of government action challenged by individuals in the
custody of the United States? (3) If not, has Congress demonstrated
that its actions fit within the constitutional predicates of the
Suspension Clause?85 For the reasons discussed, Judge Rogers
decided that the answer to the first question is yes and that the
answer to the next two questions is no. Accordingly, Judge Rogers
concluded that the attempt to revoke the Supreme Court's federal
jurisdiction exceeded Congress's powers.86 Therefore, the MCA has

79. See supra note 63.
80. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 1004-05 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Felker v. Turpin,
518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977); United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952)).

81. Id. at 1005.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1006.
84. Id. Ireturn to this point below in my discussion of Belmarsh I. See infra note 156.
85. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 1007 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
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no effect on the jurisdiction of the federal courts to consider these
petitions and appeals.87
For purposes of this Article, the most important observation in
Judge Rogers's dissenting opinion is that the Boumediene case is
fundamentally about "the role of the judiciary" and its exercise of
independent review of government action as indispensable for "the
notion of a government under law."88 Through sustained discussion
of cases in which the courts fulfilled this constitutional role of
"reviewing the Executive detention of prisoners" by engaging "in
searching factual review of the Executive's claims[,]" 9 Judge Rogers
seems concerned about maintaining the courts' historical position "as
the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative [and
executive] encroachments." 9
Through his famous reference to "a limited Constitution" in The
FederalistNo. 78, Hamilton expressly related the nature of a limited
constitution to the responsibility of an independent judiciary to
enforce restrictions on legislative action such as those articulated in
Article I, Section 9.9 The most historically resonant and sensitive
reading of Article I, Section 9 highlights (as Judge Rogers's opinion
does) the structural relationship among these provisions within the
Constitution and their expression of the rule of law values implicit in
the text (particularly when informed by Hamilton in The Federalist
No. 78).92 Each branch of government has a role in maintaining the

87.
88.
DUKER,
HABEAS

Id.
Id. at 1009 (citing Damel's Case, (1627) 3 How. St. Tr. 1, 59 (K.B.); WILLIAM F.
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 44 (1980); DANIEL J. MEADOR,
CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF POWER AND LIBERTY 13-19 (1966)).
89. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 1009-12 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
90. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., Belknap
Press 1966) (1788).
91. See id. ("The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a
limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified
exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder,
no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other
way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.").
92. For more on this point, see GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787: A
COMMENTARY 63 (1989) ("The second and third provisions of Section 9, dealing with habeas
corpus and with bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, are, in effect, an insistence upon the rule
of law that it is well to have after such great powers had been recognized for the Government of
the United States as are evident in Section 8. Perhaps this insistence upon the rule of law is
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government during times of crisis and in ensuring that the
government retains its commitment to constitutional principles even
when that commitment is tested by the circumstances. Where
judicial review of habeas claims brought by those in the custody of
the United States is concerned, the Anglo-American legal tradition
established, at least since the seventeenth century, that when an
individual detained by the government challenges the legality of his
detention, the government must establish the legality of the detention
before an independent judge.93
This is the principle with which Judge Rogers concludes her
dissenting opinion in Boumediene:

So long as the Executive can convince an independent
Article III habeas judge that it has not acted unlawfully, it
may continue to detain those alien enemy combatants who
pose a continuing threat during the active engagement of
the United States in the war on terror. But it must make
that showing and the detainees must be allowed a
meaningful opportunity to respond.94

particularly to be treasured by a people who could see, in the slavery institutions with which they
had come to be saddled, the despotism that a perversion of the rule of law can lead to.").
93. The Act of Habeas Corpus (1679) is the most important element of English law in this
regard, prefigured by the Petition of Right (1628) and supplemented by the Bill of Rights (1689).
See, e.g., PAUL O. CARRESE, THE CLOAKING OF POWER: MONTESQUIEU, BLACKSTONE, AND THE
RISE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 154 (2003) ("He [Blackstone] praises the writ of habeas corpus
secured by courts independent of the royal power, and other requirements for 'process from the
courts of judicature,' as bulwarks of personal liberty against despotism .... Blackstone praises
'that second magna carta,' the Habeas Corpus Act (1679), for fortifying this humane regime, and
while a future Parliament could reverse this, his remarks imply a constitutional and juridical limit
upon legislative power." (citation omitted)); SCOTT GORDON, CONTROLLING THE STATE:
CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM ANCIENT ATHENS TO TODAY 242-43 (1999) (quoting David Hume's
observation that the Petition of Right demonstrated the fundamental animating principle of
English government "that the English have ever been free, and have ever been governed by law
and a limited constitution" 5 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE INVASION OF
JULIUS CAESAR TO THE ABDICATION OF JAMES THE SECOND, 1688, at 37 (Boston, Phillips,
Sampson & Co. 1858)); MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 27
(Charles M. Gray ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1971) (1713) ("Exercise of Martial Law, whereby
any Person should lose his Life or Member, or Liberty, may not be permitted in Time of Peace,
when the King's Courts are open for all Persons to receive Justice, according to the Laws of the
Land. This is in Substance declared by the Petition of Right, 3 Car. I, whereby such
Commissions and Martial Law were repealed, and declared to be contrary to Law ....
");JAMES
R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, HOBBES, AND THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 45-47 (1992); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 113-16 (David Johnston trans. 1995).
94. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 1011 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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The writ of habeas corpus inherited from England and incorporated
into the United States Constitution requires the executive to justify
the legality of any challenged detention before an independent judge.
Congress cannot excuse the executive from this obligation through
an attempted statutory preclusion of judicial review unanticipated
and unsanctioned by the Constitution.
D. The Supreme Court
1. Certiorari Denied and Granted
It is a perilous temptation to predict Supreme Court decisions.
Rather than succumb to that temptation, I will instead examine the
initial denial of certiorari in an effort to anticipate how the Court will
address the questions raised by Boumediene rather than how the
Court will ultimately decide these questions.
In his dissent from the initial denial of certiorari, Justice Breyer
(joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg) begins by emphasizing that
habeas corpus exists to ensure that "judicial inquiry may be had into
the legality of the detention of a person."95 Justice Breyer also notes
several aspects of the D.C. Circuit majority decision in Boumediene
that appear to conflict with the Supreme Court's ruling in Rasul: (1)
that the federal courts had jurisdiction over the detainees' habeas
claims;96 (2) that Guantanamo Bay Naval Base "was under the
complete control and jurisdiction of the United States;"9 7 and (3) that
under the common law the writ would have been available to the
detainees.98 Moreover, Justice Breyer highlights certain factual
95. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1479 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)).
96. Id. (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004), (holding that the detainees had a
right to habeas review in federal court under the current law)). Rasul was decided before
enactment of the DTA and MCA and their purported statutory proscriptions of federal jurisdiction
over detainees' habeas claims. According to Justice Breyer, the Court's Hamdan decision
indicates that this may be immaterial where the DTA is concerned. Id. at 1480-81 (discussing
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2788 (2006), (holding that although the DTA barred
federal court jurisdiction over detainees' claims until after the DTA-authorized tribunal made a
final decision, special circumstances justified early review)).
The Court's forthcoming
Boumediene ruling will resolve these questions as to the MCA. In addition, Justice Breyer noted
that Rasul addressed the "then-operative statute" but he went on to mention that the detainees also
might have a claim to review of their detention grounded on "the constitutional habeas right as
well." Id. at 1479.
97. Id. (citing Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-81, 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)); see
also supra note 64.
98. Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. at 1479 (citing Rasul, 542 U.S. at 481-82).
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distinctions between Rasul and Boumediene that might strengthen the
Boumediene petitioners' claims for habeas review:
[P]etitioners in Boumediene are natives of Algeria, and
citizens of Bosnia, seized in Bosnia. Other detainees,
including several petitioners in Al Odah, also are citizens of
friendly nations, including Australia, Canada, Kuwait,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom; and many were seized
outside of any theater of hostility, in places like Pakistan,
It is possible that these
Thailand, and Zambia.
circumstances will make a difference in respect to our
resolution of the constitutional questions presented.99
Justice Breyer's emphasis on the "constitutional questions presented"
in Boumediene also suggests that he is cognizant of the magnitude of
the issues raised by the case. He does not simply consider the issues
as a matter of clarity in statutory expression of legislative intention.
He seems keenly aware that the case raises fundamental questions
about access to judicial review as a means of ensuring
constitutionality in government action and maintenance of habeas as
a constitutional provision to protect against potential abuses of
power. 1o
Justice Breyer's focus on the constitutional dimension of the
issues raised in Boumediene is important for an additional reason.
The federal courts have consistently distinguished between
congressional restriction of jurisdiction to review statutory claims
and congressional attempts to remove jurisdiction over constitutional
claims. While the courts are generally willing to accede to
jurisdictional ouster of statutory claims, the Supreme Court,'' the
99. Id. at 1480 (internal citations omitted) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509,
514, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
100. See id. at 1479 ("[T]he 'province' of the Great Writ, 'shaped to guarantee the most
fundamental of all rights, is to provide an effective and speedy instrument by which judicial
inquiry may be had into the legality of the detention of a person.' Yet, petitioners have been held
for more than five years. They have not obtained judicial review of their habeas claims. If
petitioners are right about the law, immediate review may avoid an additional year or more of
imprisonment. If they are wrong, our review is nevertheless appropriate to help establish the
boundaries of the constitutional provision for the writ of habeas corpus. Finally, whether
petitioners are right or wrong, our prompt review will diminish the legal 'uncertainty' that now
'surrounds' the application to Guantanamo detainees of this 'fundamental constitutional
principle."' (citations omitted) (quoting Carafas, 391 U.S. at 238)).
101. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (holding that while the
Administrative Procedure Act precludes a statutory claim by a discharged employee against the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, it does not preclude judicial review of constitutional
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D.C. Circuit,' ° and other federal courts0 3 have emphasized that
congressional denial of judicial review over constitutional claims
would deprive the courts of their constitutional and institutional
function of ensuring the legality of government action, and would
deprive the litigants of their access to an independent forum in which
constitutional claims can be asserted." The ouster clauses at issue in
Boumediene raise constitutional concerns, and Justice Breyer's
dissent from the denial of certiorari addresses the issues from this
perspective. ' 5
In addition to his analysis of the precedential weight of Rasul
with respect to Boumediene, Justice Breyer also offers four factual
and legal similarities between Hamdan and Boumediene (and one
dissimilarity that might make Boumediene an even stronger case for
judicial review of government action than Hamdan): (1) both cases
involve arguments by the government that the Court should defer
decision until the detainees' hearings are completed;0 6 (2) both cases
involve allegations of significant procedural defects (e.g., denial of

claims); Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986);
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975);
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967); Rusk v.
Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962).
102. See, e.g., Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("A statute that
removes jurisdiction from all courts to vindicate constitutionalrights poses serious constitutional
objections."); Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("In our view, a statutory
provision precluding all judicial review of constitutional issues removes from the courts an
essential judicial function under our implied constitutional mandate of separation of powers, and
deprives an individual of an independent forum for the adjudication of a claim of constitutional
right.").
103. See, e.g, Jean-Baptiste v. Reno, 144 F.3d 212, 218 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that statute
divesting courts of jurisdiction over claims of aliens arising from deportation proceedings did not
violate constitutional clause forbidding suspension of habeas corpus); Magana-Pizano v. 1NS, 152
F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998); Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 934 (3d Cir. 1996); Joelson v.
United States, 86 F.3d 1413, 1420 (6th Cir. 1996).
104. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979) ("[T]he class of those litigants who
allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the same time have no
effective means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke the
existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights.").
105. As Justice Breyer points out, this is not to say that the petitioners will or should
necessarily prevail in their case. See Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. at 1480 ("1 do not here say
petitioners are correct; I say only that the questions presented are significant ones warranting our
review."). But the courts must appreciate the nature and gravity of the issues raised to analyze
them adequately.
106. Id. at 1480 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2787 (2006)). The Court
rejected this argument in Hamdan. 126 S. Ct. at 2788.
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counsel and access to evidence);' °7 (3) both cases concern statutes
that prevent supplementation of the record on appeal and provide no
remedy for possible constitutional violations;' (4) both cases
present the Court with procedures that should be reviewed and
deemed lawful before they are enforced in the detainees' hearings;
and (5) in Boumediene, "unlike Hamdan, the military tribunals in
09
Guantanamo have completed their work."'

Consistent with the argument of this Article, Justice Breyer does
not seem to characterize the issues raised in Boumediene as the D.C.
Circuit majority did. Rather than view the case in terms of
Congress's authority to restrict federal jurisdiction as an implicit
suspension of habeas under Article 1, Section 9, Justice Breyer
instead indicated that Boumediene raises issues that are best
understood in terms of the detainees' rights to judicial review of
government action. In Justice Breyer's words, Boumediene and
Hamdan ultimately "present[] questions of the scope of the
Guantanamo detainees' right to federal-court review" of statutory
alternatives to the traditional judicial process."0 Unlike the D.C.
Circuit majority, Justice Breyer does not approach Boumediene as
raising questions about Congress's authority under the Suspension
Clause. In fact, Justice Breyer does not discuss suspension per se at
all in his dissent from the denial of certiorari. In approaching
Boumediene and Hamdan as cases about the right to court review,
Justice Breyer focuses the analysis on whether Congress's
restrictions on federal jurisdiction are consistent with the historical
purpose of the writ and the constitutional role of the courts, rather
than on whether Congress possesses the formal authority under the
Constitution to suspend habeas corpus."' Without question, the two
107. Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. at 1480 (citing Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2788).
108. Id. at 1481 (citing The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §
1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat. 2742 (2005)); Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(Rogers, J., dissenting).
109. 127 S.Ct. at 1481.
110. Id.; see also id. at 1479 (describing the question presented as "whether the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, deprives courts of jurisdiction to
consider their habeas claims, and, if so, whether that deprivation is constitutional").
11. See id. at 1479 (beginning analysis by examining "the 'province' of the Great Writ"); see
also Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (noting that "[w]here... no emergency prevents consultation
with Congress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Nation's ability to
deal with danger"). Justice Breyer also acknowledges Congress's authority over habeas corpus,
stating that "[n]othing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek.., authority"
for military commissions. Id.
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issues cannot be entirely disaggregated. However, the direction in
which the questions are addressed is significant for the Court (or at
least for Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter) to preserve the nature
of the judicial process and individual access to independent court
review of government action, which are so central to the historical
and doctrinal development of habeas within the Anglo-American
constitutional tradition.
Justice Breyer's dissent from the denial of certiorari, and Justice
Rogers's dissent from the D.C. Circuit decision, view Boumediene as
a matter of the rights of detainees to obtain judicial review of the
legality of their detention. If the MCA and the DTA operate to
deprive detainees of all meaningful access to challenge the legality of
their treatment by the government, then these statutes operate to
insulate the government from any genuine accountability to the rule
of law. There is no reason to suppose that any provision of the
Constitution can provide Congress with this authority. As I explain
in my discussion of the Belmarsh I decision, the English judiciary's
response to certain steps taken by the British government after
September 11 seem more consistent with the dissents of Justice
Breyer and Judge Rogers, and more fully cognizant of and
responsive to the magnitude of the constitutional issues at stake, than
the D.C. Circuit majority's approach in Boumediene.
2. The Oral Argument
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Boumediene on
December 5, 2007. In his initial question of Seth Waxman, counsel
for the petitioners, Justice Scalia asked whether counsel could cite "a
single case in the 220 years of our country or, for that matter, in the
five centuries of the English empire in which habeas was granted to
an alien in a territory that was not under the sovereign control of
either the United States or England."' 2 Of course, as I have argued
earlier, "sovereignty" is a particularly unhelpful analytic frame
through which to consider the issues in Boumediene."3 And, as far
112. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Boumediene v. Bush, Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196 (U.S.
Dec. 5, 2007), 2007 WL 4252686.
113. Counsel's responses to Justice Scalia on the sovereignty and citizenship points address
these issues historically and conceptually:
[E]ven with respect to the persons detained outside the English realm, the relevant
question was, is this person under the subjection of the crown? Not what is the
subjecthood or citizenship of this person?... We don't contend that the United States
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as Justice Scalia's question goes with respect to an English court
recognizing the habeas rights of aliens, one need look no further than
the Belmarsh cases that I consider in the next part of this Article.
In the questioning of counsel for the government, Solicitor
General Paul Clement, Justice Breyer picked up where he left off in
his dissent from the initial denial of certiorari. Specifically, Justice
Breyer inquired about the adequacy of the statutory alternative to
habeas under the DTA. In doing so, Justice Breyer emphasized the
constitutional constraints on government action that habeas exists to
preserve: "[W]hat you want to say [as a detainee] is: Judge, I don't
care how good those procedures are. I'm from Bosnia. I've been
here six years. The Constitution of the United States does not give
anyone the right to hold me six years in Guantanamo without either
charging me or releasing me, in the absence of some special
procedure in Congress for preventive detention. . . . If he cannot
make that argument, how does this become an equivalent to habeas,
since that happens to be the argument that a large number of these
305 people would like to make?""' 4
In relation to the three principal points of divergence between
the D.C. Circuit majority opinion in Boumediene and the Supreme
Court's ruling in Rasul-the federal courts' jurisdiction over the
detainees' habeas claims, U.S. control over Guantanamo, and the
availability to the detainees of the common law habeas writ-the
first point received the least discussion at oral argument. Although
the issue of the DTA ouster clause and the purported denial of
jurisdiction was raised in passing during the Boumediene
exercises sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay. Our contention is that at common law,
sovereignty (a) wasn't the test, as Lord Mansfield explained, and (b) wasn't a clear-cut
determine-there weren't clear-cut sovereignty lines in those days. Our case doesn't
depend on sovereignty. It depends on the fact that, among other things, the United
States exercises-quote-'complete jurisdiction and control over this base.' No other
law applies.
Id.at 13-14. In addition, on the point regarding exclusive U.S. control over Guantanamo, Justice
Ginsburg later referred to the determination of that issue in Rasul. See id. at 31 ("1 thought this
was decided in Rasul. That's why I am so puzzled by the Government's position. I think Justice
Kennedy said it most clearly when he said that, well, in every practical respect, Guantanamo Bay
is U.S. territory; and whatever Congress recently passed, they can't, as you pointed out, change
the terms of the lease.").
114. Id. at 38-39; see also id. at 54 ("[W]e [detainees] still think that Congress, the President,
the Supreme Court under the law, cannot hold us for six years without either trying us, releasing
us, or maybe confining us under some special statute involving preventive detention and danger
which has not yet been enacted.").
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argument," 5 it was not addressed in any detail. Of course, there are
many conceivable explanations for the lack of questioning by the
Court on this question. But, it would be unfortunate if the Court's
opinion(s) is similarly silent on the matter.
III. ENGLAND: DETENTION, TORTURE,
CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY
Like the United States, Britain made legislation a central facet of
its response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 ("Anti-Terrosism Act")
provided, among other things, for indefinite detention of aliens
deemed by the British government to represent a threat to national
security." 6 As the United States did with the alien enemy combatant
detainees held in Guantanamo, Britain detained foreign nationals
without counsel or hearing at a facility under the control of the
British government." 7 The British detention facility is known as
"Belmarsh." And as with the Guantanamo detainees, several of the
Belmarsh detainees brought a legal challenge to various aspects of
their detention, claiming violations of British constitutional
principles. '

115. See id. at 67 (Ginsburg, J.) ("Congress's statute that set up this system with limited
review in the D.C. Circuit and... that's it. The D.C. Circuit never got to that question because it
said the acts that these people are trying to bring habeas doesn't exist. The only thing that they
have, the only remedy they have is the one that Congress provided. And it seems to me the only
question before us is whether there is jurisdiction in the court of appeals to decide that threshold
issue.").
116. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, 24, § 23 (Eng.).
117. See Denise Winterman, Belmarsh-Britain's Guantanamo Bay?, BBC NEWS, Oct. 6,
2004, http: //news.bbc.co.uk/l/magazine/3714864.stm (comparing London's Belmarsh prison to
Guantanamo).
118. I do not mean to suggest that the legal responses of the British and American
governments, or the detention measures and facilities in Belmarsh and Guantanamo, are identical.
Baroness Hale rightly notes that they are not. See A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't
(Belmarsh 1) [2004] UKHL 56, [223] (appeal taken from Eng.). Nevertheless, there are important
parallels to be drawn, particularly in light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), and Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). I should note, though, that the
presence of Belmarsh Prison within the United Kingdom and the location of Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base outside of the territorial United States is not an issue that I address in detail here (in
part because, as I explained above, the physical location of the detention facilities is not
necessarily their most salient characteristic for my purposes).
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A. Belmarsh I: Detention

The House of Lords first reviewed the claims of detainees held
at Belmarsh in A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.'19

As others have done, I will refer to the case as "Belmarsh 1"' (after
the prison where the detainees are held).'2 ° As Lord Bingham
pointed out in his speech, the detainees "share certain common
characteristics which are central to their appeals."' 2
These
characteristics include the following: (1) none of the appellants is a
British citizen; (2) none has been charged with any crime; (3) none
would apparently be charged in the foreseeable future; and (4) all
22
claimed that their detention violated British and international law.
The legislative response in Britain to the September 11 attacks
centers on the Anti-Terrorism Act and the Designated Derogation
Order of 2001 ("Derogation Order") to the Human Rights Act of
1998.123 Within the framework of British law, these two enactments
intersected with the Immigration Act of 1971124 and the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms,' 25 which was incorporated into U.K. law by the Human
Rights Act. 126 As interpreted and applied by the House of Lords, the
Immigration Act permitted detention of non-British nationals "only
for such time as was reasonably necessary for the process of
119. [2004] UKHL 56. Ordinarily, the House of Lords hears appeals in panels of five.
Occasionally, the House will sit as a panel of seven. See MICHAEL ZANDER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 622 (9th ed. 2003). Extraordinarily, in something
akin to an en banc hearing, nine members of the House heard the Belmarsh I appeal.
120. See DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF
EMERGENCY 31, 174 (2006); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "A Decent Respect to the Opinions of
[Human]kind": The Value of a Comparative Perspective in ConstitutionalAdjudication, I FLA.
INT'L U. L. REV. 27, 41 (2006).
121. Belmarsh 1 [2004] UKIL 56 at [3].
122. Id. As with my discussion of Boumediene, I do not address the international law claims.
123. The Human Rights Act of 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order, 2001, S.I. 2001/3644
(U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si200l/20013644.htm. These responses also build
upon legislation that predated the September II attacks on the United States. The operative legal
definition of "terrorism," for example, derives from the Terrorism Act of 2000. See Belmarsh I,
[2004] UKHL 56 at [5]. For the importance of this aspect of British law to Lord Walker's
judgment, see id. at [198]-[206].
124. Immigration Act, 1971, c. 77 (U.K.).
125. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental
Freedoms,
Nov.
4,
1950,
213
U.N.T.S.
221,
available at
http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/teleam/global/ilo/law/coeprot.htm.
126. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/
acts 1998/19980042.htm.
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Accordingly, there is no provision

in British law for the indefinite detention of non-British nationals,
and this principle was understood to be consistent with Britain's
incorporation of the European Convention under the Human Rights
28
Act.
As a response to the September 11 attacks, the Derogation Order
was a public statement with legislative force that the United
Kingdom intended to deviate from the existing legal prohibition
The Order
against extended detention of foreign nationals.
acknowledged the existence and effect of the Immigration Act and
the European Convention and articulated the necessity of derogating
from those existing legal principles in light of the threat terrorism
posed to British national security.' In conjunction with the Order's
expression and explication of the alteration of British law regarding
detention of foreign nationals, the Anti-Terrorism Act provided for
certification by the Secretary of State of suspected terrorists and
indefinite detention of those certified under the Act.13 °
The Belmarsh I detainees argued before the House that their
detention under the Anti-Terrorism Act and the Derogation Order
was improper for several reasons. First, the United Kingdom could
not legally derogate from its commitment to honor the European
Convention. 3 ' Second, there was no "public emergency threatening
the life of the nation" that would support derogation from Britain's
obligations under Article 15 of the Convention,' because there was
no "imminent" threat to the United Kingdom, the emergency was not
"temporary," and no other nation saw fit to derogate from their
obligations under the Convention in the aftermath of September
11.133 Third, the derogative elements contained in Part Four of the
Anti-Terrorism Act violate the principle of proportionality.
According to the proportionality principle, any limitation of a

127. Belmarsh I [2004] UKHL 56 at [8] (citing R v. Governor of Durham Prison (Ex parte
Singh), [1984] 1 W.L.R. 704 (Q.B. 1983)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at [11].
130. Id. at [12]-[14] (discussing the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 4, §§
21-23 (Eng.)).
131. Seeidat [3].
132. See id. at [16], [19], [24].
133. See id. at [20], [23].
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fundamental right (in this case, the right to personal liberty'34 ) based
upon a claim of public emergency must be strictly limited in
proportion to the threat. 35 The detainees argued that the indefinite
detention provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act and the Derogation
Order were excessive because the terrorist threat posed by British
nationals and non-British nationals was equivalent, yet only nonBritish nationals were subject to indefinite detention under the Act.136
While the House ultimately rejected the detainees' argument
regarding the absence of a "public emergency,"' 37 it ruled that the
detainees could seek judicial review of the Derogation Order on
proportionality grounds.138 And in keeping with the argument of this
Article, Lord Bingham emphasized that the House's decision in
Belmarsh I was driven by the constitutional necessity of maintaining
the courts' role in enforcing principled legal constraints on
government action:
It also follows that I do not accept the full breadth of the
Attorney General's submissions. I do not in particular
accept the distinction which he drew between democratic
institutions and the courts. It is of course true that the
judges in this country are not elected and are not
answerable to Parliament. It is also of course true ... that
Parliament, the executive and the courts have different
functions. But the function of independent judges charged
to interpret and apply the law is universally recognised as a
cardinal feature of the modem democratic state, a
cornerstone of the rule of law itself. The Attorney General
is fully entitled to insist on the proper limits of judicial
authority, but he is wrong to stigmatise judicial decision134. Id. at [36] ("In urging the fundamental importance of the right to personal freedom, as
the sixth step in their proportionality argument, the appellants were able to draw on the long
libertarian tradition of English law, dating back to chapter 39 of Magna Carta 1215, given effect
in the ancient remedy of habeas corpus, declared in the Petition of Right 1628, upheld in a series
of landmark decisions down the centuries and embodied in the substance and procedure of the
law to our own day."); see also id. at [81], [100]-[01].
135. See id. at [30] (other citation omitted) (citing De Freitas v. Permanent Sec'y of Ministry
of Agric., Fisheries, Lands and Hous., [1999] 1 A.C. 69, 80 (P.C. 1998) (appeal taken from Ant.
& Barb.)).
136. Seeid. at [31].
137. See id. at [26]-[29]. But see id. at [94]-[97] (giving credence to the argument that the
"public emergency" threat is lacking).

138. See id. at [42].
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. The 1998

[Human Rights] Act gives the courts a very specific, wholly
democratic, mandate. As Professor Jowell has put it: "The
courts are charged by Parliament with39 delineating the
'
boundaries of a rights-based democracy."'

Lord Bingham's explicit reference to the function of independent
judges in interpreting and applying the law as a cornerstone of the
rule of law links the House's decision in Belmarsh I with the
opinions of Justice Breyer and Judge Rogers in Boumediene. All of
these judges recognize the constitutional responsibility of their
institutional position to ensure that the rule of law is maintained in
the course of their governments' responses to the threats of terrorism.
In relation to the detainees' proportionality argument, Lord
Bingham acknowledged that the terrorist threat posed by British
nationals and foreign nations is not necessarily identical. But the
House determined that this was fundamentally a difference in degree,
not a difference in kind. 4° Accordingly, the House ruled that the
differentiation between British nationals and foreign nationals, and
the potential indefinite detention of foreign nationals, violated British
law' and EU law.'42 Moreover, the House determined that this
differentiation between British nationals and foreign nationals for
purposes of detention amounted to discrimination on the basis of
nationality, which was itself an independent violation of British and
EU law.' 43 Finally, the House issued a declaration of incompatibility
under Section Four of the Human Rights Act.'44 This declaration of
incompatibility is the legal procedure by which a court indicates to a
national legislature that a statute conflicts with EU law and should, in

139. Id. (other citation omitted) (quoting Jeffrey Jowell, JudicialDeference: Servility, Civility
or Institutional Capacity?, 2003 Pub. L. 592, 597); see also id. at [80].
140. Id. at [33]-[34], [43].
141. Their Lordships appear to disagree somewhat about whether the government's actions in
Belmarsh Iviolate British, as opposed to EU, law. Compare id. at [144], [160], [164] with id. at
[36], [81], [100]-[01]. The details of this disagreement are beyond the scope of this Article. But,
this disagreement may have something important to do with differing views among their
Lordships of the judiciary's institutional authority in British constitutional government. I
mention the disagreement because this concept touches upon my central argument.
142. See id. at [43], [76]-[78], [83], [1261, [132], [189].
143. See id. at [68], [138], [158]-[59].

144. Id. at [73], [139], [239].

Winter 2008]

INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY

the court's judgment, be amended or rescinded.145 In response to the
House's declaration of incompatibility in Belmarsh I, the offending
sections of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act were
repealed by the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005.146
In addition to Lord Bingham's comments in Belmarsh I
regarding the function of the judiciary in maintaining the rule of law,
Lord Hope emphasized this aspect of the courts' institutional and
constitutional responsibility as well. Lord Hope described this as the
courts' duty to maintain and enforce individual rights.'47 Lord Hope
also noted that British nationals and foreign nationals possess the
fundamental right to liberty in equal measure.' 48
As the government did in the United States cases, the British
government argued in Belmarsh I that the courts should defer to the
executive and the legislature regarding the nature of the threats posed
by terrorism and the necessity of the actions taken in response.149
Lord Hope's response to this argument is especially important for the
145. See id. at [90], [220]; see also A.W. Bradley, The Sovereignty of Parliament-Formor
Substance?, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 23, 53-56 (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds.,
4th ed. 2000); Lord Lester of Herne Hill, Human Rights and the British Constitution, in THE
CHANGING CONSTITUTION 89, 105 (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 4th ed. 2000) ("The
declaration of incompatibility is essential in bringing the problem to the attention of the executive
and the legislature, and acting as a trigger for amending legislation by means of a remedial order.
Despite its incompatibility with Convention rights, the offending legislation will remain valid and
effective, unless and until legislative amendments are made.").
146. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2, § 16(2)(a) (Eng.) (repealing Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, §§ 21-32).
147. See Belmarsh 1 [2004] UKHL 56 at [99].
148. See id. at [105]. This is not to say that the British government may not enforce
immigration regulations and restrictions against foreign nationals. But this is to say that any
derogation from the evenhanded enforcement of those regulations is a potential violation of the
right to liberty itself, which is not enjoyed to any diminished extent simply because an individual
does not happen to be a British citizen. See id. at [105]-[06] ("The Secretary of State was, of
course, entitled to discriminate between British nationals on the one hand and foreign nationals
What he was not entitled to do was
on the other for all the purposes of immigration control ....
to treat the right to liberty under article 5 of the Convention of foreign nationals who happen to be
in this country for whatever reason as different in any respect from that enjoyed by British
nationals ....
I would therefore take as my starting point the proposition that the article 5 right to
liberty is a fundamental right which belongs to everyone who happens to be in this country,
irrespective of his or her nationality or citizenship. The court is obliged to subject the Derogation
Order and the legislation that resulted from it as it affects foreign nationals to the same degree of
scrutiny as it would have to be given if it had been designed to deprive British nationals of their
right to liberty." (citations omitted)). For further discussion relating to this point, see Daniel
Moeckli, The Selective "War on Terror": Executive Detention of Foreign Nationals and the
PrincipleofNon-Discrimination,31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 525-31 (2006).
149. See Belmarsh I [2004] UKHL 56 at [107] (noting that "[t]he Attorney General also
submitted that a wide margin of discretion should be accorded at each stage in the analysis to the
executive and to Parliament").
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purposes of this Article. Not only did Lord Hope underscore the
nature of the liberty interest involved, he explicitly connected the
courts' role in enforcing individual rights against the government to
the courts' role in preserving the rule of law:
Here the context is set by the nature of the right to liberty
which the Convention guarantees to everyone, and by the
responsibility that rests on the court to give effect to the
guarantee to minimise the risk of arbitrariness and to ensure
the rule of law. Its absolute nature, save only in the
circumstances that are expressly provided for by article
5(1), indicates that any interference with the right to liberty
must be accorded the fullest and most anxious scrutiny.
Put another way, the margin of the discretionary
judgment that the courts will accord to the executive and to
Parliament where this right is in issue is narrower than will
be appropriate in other contexts. We are not dealing here
with matters of social or economic policy, where opinions
may reasonably differ in a democratic society and where
choices on behalf of the country as a whole are properly left
to government and to the legislature. We are dealing with
actions taken on behalf of society as a whole which affect
the rights and freedoms of the individual. This is where the
courts may legitimately intervene, to ensure that the actions
taken are proportionate. 5 °
Lord Hope's discussion of the courts' institutional obligation to
enforce individual rights against the government as a means of
preserving the rule of law as a constitutional value is instructive.
Read as a response to the D.C. Circuit majority's approach in
Boumediene, Lord Hope simply does not agree that the question
should be framed in terms of the formal powers of the legislature. 5 '
Instead, as Lord Bingham, Lord Rodger,'52 Justice Breyer and Judge
150. Id. at [107]-[08] (citation omitted); see also id. at [1141.
151. See id. at [1761 (stating that "deference to the views of the [legislature] ...cannot be
taken too far. Due deference does not mean abasement before those views.... The legitimacy of
the courts' scrutiny role cannot be in doubt.").
152. See id. at [178] ("In discharging that duty British courts are performing their traditional
role of watching over the liberty of everyone within their jurisdiction, regardless of
nationality .... Here the exercise happens to take the particular form of examining the grounds
for the derogation from the basic guarantees in article 5 of the Convention, which aim to secure
the right of individuals in a democracy to be free from arbitrary detention at the hands of the
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Rogers did, he treats the issue as a matter of the constitutional role
and responsibility of the judiciary.'
B. Belmarsh II: Torture
One year after its decision in Belmarsh I, the House of Lords
heard a subsequent appeal on behalf of the same group of
detainees.'54 In this case, which I will refer to as "Belmarsh II," the
House was asked to consider whether the Special Immigration
Appeals Commission ("SIAC"),'55 which is the administrative
tribunal authorized by Parliament to hear cases under the AntiTerrorism Act, could hear evidence that might have been obtained
through torture that was conducted without the participation or
authorization of the British government.'56 In the proceedings below,
when this issue was raised, the SIAC determined that the
procurement of evidence through torture was a fact that went to the
weight, but not to the admissibility, of the evidence.'57
authorities. In performing this role and checking whether detention of the foreign suspects, such
as the appellants, was strictly required, the courts are entitled to have regard to the extent of the
inroad which it makes into the liberty of those foreign suspects: the greater the inroad, the greater
the care with which the justification for it must be examined. On any view, the inroad into the
appellants' liberty is far-reaching." (citations omitted)).
153. See id. at [177] (noting that "scrutiny by the courts is appropriate" because "[t]here is
always a danger that, by its very nature, a concern for national security may bring forth measures
that are not objectively justified").
154. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't (No. 2) (Belmarsh II) [2005] UKHL 71 (appeal
taken from Eng.). Belmarsh H was heard by a panel of seven Law Lords.
155. See Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act, 1997, c. 68, available at http://
www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1997/ukpga-19970068-enI (creating a court to hear deportation
appeals).
156. Belmarsh 11 [2005] UKHL 71 at [1]. The United States courts that have addressed this
point have tended to focus on the question of involvement by or authorization of United States
officials. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing United
States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 281 (2d Cir. 1974)); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88,
117 (2d Cir. 1998). However, the House was less concerned with the question of British
involvement than with the impact of the tainted evidence upon the integrity of the judicial process
itself. See Belmarsh II [2005] UKHL 71 at [51]-[52] (Lord Bingham) ("It trivialises the issue
before the House to treat it as an argument about the law of evidence. The issue is one of
constitutional principle, whether evidence obtained by torturing another human being may
lawfully be admitted against a party to proceedings in a British court, irrespective of where, or by
whom, or on whose authority the torture was inflicted. To that question I would give a very clear
negative answer. I accept the broad thrust of the appellants' argument on the common law. The
principles of the common law, standing alone, in my opinion compel the exclusion of third party
torture evidence as unreliable, unfair, offensive to ordinary standards of humanity and decency
and incompatible with the principles which should animate a tribunal seeking to administer
justice."); see also id. at [91].
157. Belmarsh II [2005] UKHL 71 at [9].
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The House disagreed. Lord Bingham and Lord Nicholls
underscored the common law's longstanding prohibition against
torture of all types, for all purposes.'58 And although this prohibition
was not always respected by Crown, torture was consistently
declared to be "totally repugnant to the fundamental principles of
English law" and "repugnant to reason, justice, and humanity."' 59
The legal proscription of torture in English law was formalized in
1640 and seems to have been followed faithfully (but not entirely
without exception).160

In their argument before the House, the detainees relied upon the
common law prohibition against torture as a legal foundation for
their more specific claim that the use of evidence obtained via torture
violates the principle that the government cannot introduce an
involuntary confession as evidence against the defendant. 6 ' The
Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984162 codified this common

law principle and requires that, where a defendant asserts that a
158. Id. at [11] ("[F]rom its very earliest days the common law of England set its face firmly
against the use of torture. Its rejection of this practice was indeed hailed as a distinguishing
feature of the common law.... In rejecting the use of torture, whether applied to potential
defendants or potential witnesses, the common law was moved by the cruelty of the practice as
applied to those not convicted of crime, by the inherent unreliability of confessions or evidence so
procured and by the belief that it degraded all those who lent themselves to the practice."
(citations omitted) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 320-21 (William C. Jones ed., Bancroft Whitney 1915) (1769)); 3 SIR EDWARD COKE,
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 34-36 (1644); SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DELAUDIBUS
LEGUM ANGLIAE 47-53 (S.B. Chrimes ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1942); 2 SIR
THOMAS SMITH, DEREPUBLICA ANGLORUM: A DISCOURSE ON THE COMMONWEALTH OF
ENGLAND 104-07 (L. Alston ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1906); 1 SIR JAMES STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 222 (London, Macmillan 1883)); see also id. at
[64]-[65] (arguing that torture is unacceptable and discussing the history of torture in the Privy
Council).
159. Id. at [12] (quoting DAVID JARDINE, A READING ON THE USE OF TORTURE IN THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND PREVIOUSLY TO THE COMMONWEALTH 6, 12 (London, Baldwin &
Cradock 1837)); see also id. at [81]-[83], [112], [129], [152].
160. Id. at [12], [131, [86].
161. The detainees also relied on provisions of EU and international law, which I will not
discuss due to space constraints. See id. at [23]-[52]. And they extended their argument from
torture to inhumane and degrading treatment. See id. at [53]. The more general argument made
by the detainees in relation to evidence procured by torture would seem to suggest that in the
United States, as well, a claim could probably arise in the form of a due process violation. For an
argument to this effect, see Baher Azmy, ConstitutionalImplications of the War on Terror: Rasul
v. Bush and the Intra-TerritorialConstitution, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 369, 419-20, 42931 (2007), and see also John Duberstein, Excluding Torture: A Comparison of the British and
American Approaches to Evidence Obtained by Third Party Torture, 32 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 159, 180-91 (2006).
162. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60 (U.K.).
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confession was obtained improperly, the government must
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was not
the result of oppressive conduct.'6 3 In reliance on the statutory and
decisional law on this subject, the House concluded that the use of
torture to obtain evidence goes to the admissibility, rather than the
weight, of the evidence.'" In other words, where the government
cannot rebut the claim that evidence was obtained by torture, that
evidence must be excluded.'65
In addition to their argument that the use of evidence procured
by torture is analogous to admission of an involuntary confession,
the detainees argued that the use of evidence obtained by torture
amounts to an abuse of the judicial process and the judicial
institution.'66 For purposes of this Article, this argument is critical.
The detainees argued that common law principles protect against the
163. See Belmarsh 11 [2005] UK-L 71 at [14] (citing Lam Chi-ming v. The Queen, [1991] 2
A.C. 212, 220 (P.C.) (appeal taken from H.K.); R v. Harz, [1967] 1 A.C. 760, 817 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.); Ibrahim v. The King, [1914] A.C. 599, 609-10 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
H.K.)).
164. Id. at [15].
165. Id. (citing Wong Kam-ming v. The Queen, [1980] A.C. 247 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
H.K.)). I should mention that the House could not agree on the burden of proof question. Lords
Bingham, Nicholls, and Hoffmann concluded that the initial burden belongs to the individual to
assert that evidence was obtained through torture, but at that point the burden should shift to the
Secretary of State to demonstrate that evidence was not obtained through torture. And, where the
SIAC cannot definitively determine that the evidence was not obtained through torture, it should
be excluded. See id. at [56], [80], [98]. Lords Hope, Rodger, Carswell, and Brown agreed that
the burden should not rest on the individual once the initial assertion of torture has been made;
however, Lords Hope, Rodger, Carswell, and Brown believed that the SIAC should determine
whether the evidence was definitively acquired via torture, rather than establish that the evidence
was not acquired via torture. See id. at [116]-[26], [138]-[45], [156]-[58], [172]. The key here
is that Lords Bingham, Nicholls, and Hoffmann would exclude evidence absent an affirmative
showing that the evidence was not tainted, while Lords Hope, Rodger, Carswell, and Brown
would accept evidence absent a demonstration that the evidence was tainted. A contrast here
between the English and American cases is that the House seemed willing to consider evidence
about known practices regarding torture as probative evidence that a particular individual was
more likely to have been tortured. See id. at [56]. A line of federal cases in the United States
seems to establish a fairly broad prohibition against the introduction of evidence obtained through
torture. See, e.g., LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 1974) ("It is unthinkable that a
statement obtained by torture or by other conduct belonging only in a police state should be
admitted at the government's behest in order to bolster its case."); Filartiga v. Pena-trala, 630
F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452 91, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc.
A/1034 (Dec. 9 1975) available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/declarationcat.htm).
Nevertheless, certain United States courts have indicated some reticence concerning the
admissibility of state practices to support an individual claim that evidence was acquired by
torture. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 129 n.59 (2d Cir. 2003).
166. Belmarsh II [2005] UKHL 71 at [18]-[22].
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use of evidence gathered through torture because "the infliction of
torture is so grave a breach of... the rule of law that any court
degrades itself and the administration of justice by admitting it....
[T]he court must exercise its discretion to reject such evidence as an
abuse of its process." 167
More than any other issue or argument in the Belmarsh cases,
the abuse of process principle most directly and concretely links the
judicial function to the rule of law as an institutional and
constitutional matter. This principle recognizes that the judicial
process itself-the individual challenge to government action raised
before an independent judge-is intrinsic to the Anglo-American
tradition of constitutionalism. The central point, which the House
endorsed and reaffirmed, is that the judiciary has an independent
constitutional obligation to maintain the rule of law, even in the face
of apparent abuse of power by the executive or the legislature:
[T]he judiciary [must] accept a responsibility for the
maintenance of the rule of law that embraces a willingness
to oversee executive action and to refuse to countenance
behaviour that threatens either basic human rights or the
rule of law....
...[Where] it offends the court's sense of justice and
propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances
of a particular case.
... [T]he court, in order to protect its own process
from being degraded and misused, must have the power to
stay proceedings which have come before it and have only
been made possible by acts which offend the court's
conscience as being contrary to the rule of law. 6 '
Lord Bingham concluded that this principle gave the judiciary the
inherent authority to prevent threats to the rule of law by exercising
167. Id. at [18].
168. Rv. Horseferry Rd. Magistrates' Ct. (Exparte Bennett), [1994] 1 A.C. 42, 61-62, 74, 76
(H.L. 1993) (appeal taken from Eng.), quoted in Belmarsh II [2005] UKHL 71 at [19]. The
House also noted that this principle exists in United States law as well. See Belmarsh II [2005]
UKHL 71 at [19] (citing United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275-76 (2d Cir. 1974)); see
also R v. Looseley [2001] UKHL 53, [1] (appeal taken from Eng.); R v. Mullen, [2000] Q.B. 520,
535-36.
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its "jurisdiction to prevent abuse of executive power."69 Lords
Nicholls, Hoffmann, and Brown reinforced this point by highlighting
explicitly the different institutional functions and responsibilities of
the executive and the judiciary. 7 ' And Lord Hoffmann went on to
recognize that preservation of the integrity of the judicial process by
the judiciary itself helps to demonstrate that this is the most
fundamental basis for excluding improperly obtained evidence:
[What is] the purpose of the rule excluding evidence
obtained by torture[?]...

Is it to discipline the executive

agents of the state by demonstrating that no advantage will
come from torturing witnesses, or is it to preserve the
integrity of the judicial process and the honour of English
law? If it is the former, then of course we cannot aspire to
Their
discipline the agents of foreign governments.
torturers would probably accept with indifference the
possibility that the work of their hands might be rejected by
an English court. If it is the latter, then the rule must
exclude statements obtained by torture anywhere, since the
stain attaching to such evidence will defile an English court

169. Belmarsh II [2005] UKHL 71 at [22].
170. See id. at [70] (Lord Nicholls) ("The executive and the judiciary have different functions
and different responsibilities. It is one thing for tainted information to be used by the executive
when making operational decisions or by the police when exercising their investigatory powers,
including powers of arrest. These steps do not impinge upon the liberty of individuals or, when
they do, they are of an essentially short-term interim character. Often there is an urgent need for
action. It is an altogether different matter for the judicial arm of the state to admit such
information as evidence when adjudicating definitively upon the guilt or innocence of a person
charged with a criminal offence. In the latter case repugnance to torture demands that proof of
facts should be found in more acceptable sources than information extracted by torture."); see
also id. at [94]-[95] (Lord Hoffmann) ("[Tlhe 2001 Act makes the exercise by the Secretary of
State of his extraordinary powers subject to judicial supervision.... It [the SIAC] is to form its
own opinion, after calm judicial process, as to whether it considers that there are reasonable
grounds for such suspicion or belief. It is exercising a judicial, not an executive function.
Indeed, the fact that the exercise of the draconian powers conferred by the Act was subject to
review by the judiciary was obviously an important reason why Parliament was willing to confer
such powers on the Secretary of State. In my opinion Parliament, in setting up a court to review
the question of whether reasonable grounds exist for suspicion or belief, was expecting the court
to behave like a court. In the absence of clear express provision to the contrary, that would
include the application of the standards of justice which have traditionally characterised the
proceedings of English courts. It excludes the use of evidence obtained by torture, whatever
might be its source."); id. at [161]-[62] (Lord Brown). There is an alternative that is not
contained in the existing statutory scheme in which prosecutors, rather than the police or the
courts, would make the determination regarding the quality and sufficiency of the evidence. See
Clive Walker, Keeping Control of Terrorists Without Losing Control of Constitutionalism, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1429-30 (2007).
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whatever the nationality of the torturer. I have no doubt
that the purpose of the rule is not to discipline the
executive, although this may be an incidental consequence.
It is to uphold the integrity of the administration of
justice. 7'
I discuss this point in detail in the next section.
IV. GOVERNMENT LIMITED BY LAW:
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE
JURISDICTION TO PRESERVE THE JUDICIAL INSTITUTION

Along with the preservation of trial by jury and the prohibition
against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, the preservation of
the writ of habeas corpus is a provision of the unamended United
States Constitution that most patently incorporates fundamental
rights and principles of the English Constitution.'
At the most
fundamental level, the institutional function of the judiciary and the
constitutional provisions for the courts' independence are united by a
conviction that the rule of law erects "a constitutional barrier
between the governors and the governed, between power and the
people."' 73 In the Anglo-American legal tradition, the courts occupy
the institutional position between the government and the governed,

171. Belmarsh II [2005] UKHL 71 at [91]; see also id. at [137] (Lord Rodger), [150] (Lord
Carswell), [ 164] (Lord Brown).
172. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 558 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
writ of habeas corpus was preserved in the Constitution-the only common-law writ to be
explicitly mentioned."); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973) ("By the time the
American Colonies achieved independence, the use of habeas corpus to secure release from
unlawful physical confinement, whether judicially imposed or not, was thus an integral part of
our common-law heritage. The writ was given explicit recognition in the Suspension Clause of
the Constitution ....
");Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 484 n.2 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("We are dealing with a writ antecedent to statute, and throwing its root deep into the
genius of our common law ....It has through the ages been jealously maintained by Courts of
Law as a check upon the illegal usurpation of power by the Executive at the cost of the liege."
(quoting Sec'y of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, [1923] A.C. 603, 609 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.))); see also DAVID CLARK & GERARD McCoY, THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
RIGHT: HABEAS CORPUS INTHE COMMONWEALTH 29 (2000) ("One of the earliest constitutional
provisions to protect the writ of habeas corpus is to be found in the United States Constitution
1787...."); ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY
37-38 (2001).
173. Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Democracy and the Rule of Law, in THE
RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 97, 97-100 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan eds.,
1987).
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enforcing the legal limitations on government action that are
definitive of constitutionalism.'74
The notion that an independent judiciary possesses a unique
institutional and constitutional position in protecting individual
rights, thereby preserving the rule of law, is hardly novel." 5
Nevertheless, familiarity should not allow us to underestimate or
overlook the enduring emphasis in England and the United States on
the institutional role and constitutional responsibility of the
independent judiciary to maintain the rule of law.'76 This judicial
role and responsibility is a cardinal feature that distinguishes a
government bound by the rule of law from the exercise of arbitrary
power and the presence of a police state.' 77 The United States
174. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 93, at 256 ("During the seventeenth century not only did
Parliament become established as a powerful political institution; the foundation was also laid for
the role of the judiciary as a protective buffer between the government and the citizenry, a role
that it plays in all modem constitutional polities."); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF
LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 52 (2004) ("The judiciary is the point of most direct
confrontation between the government, law, and the individual, and it can therefore serve as the
best barrier against lawless governmental actions.").
175. See generally JOHN PHILLIP REID, RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN
THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 6-7 (2004) (explaining how analysis of key
historical events can help individuals understand the nuances of the rule of law); ELIZABETH
WICKS, THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTION: EIGHT KEY MOMENTS IN BRITISH
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 24-25 (2006) (describing how certain events in British history
shaped the Constitution). To be sure, an independent judiciary was never thought to be the
panacea for every potential abuse of power, and the familiar reservation that judicial
independence could lead to the rule of judges replacing the rule of law has long preoccupied some
politicians and scholars. See JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT:
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 149-50, 211 (1999).
176. See, e.g., CARRESE, supra note 93, at 182-83 ("The first cause of an independent
judiciary and its subsequent rise to power in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America seems to
be the blending of Montesquieu's complicated liberal constitutionalism with the common-law
tradition of mixed constitutionalism, something undertaken nowhere more extensively than in
America. . . . Hamilton and Marshall argued for judicial independence, a common-law
profession, and judicial review so as to establish judges as guardians of constitutional tradition
and limited government."); TAMANAHA, supra note 174, at 117; VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 93,
at 98 ("The parliamentary and constitutional monarchy which ... took shape in England...
provided a solid central government, which protected the national interest, but was nevertheless
bound to operate within the parameters of the law, inter alia, because of the impact of an
influential and independent judicature.").
177. See VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 93, at 16-18 ("The opposite of the Rechtsstaat is the
Polizeistaat('police state') or the Machtssaat('state based on might'), where the arbitrary will of
the persons in power prevails and the rulers do not have to observe legal norms. In the one case
the citizens are governed by laws rather than by people, in the other the opposite applies. A
judiciary which is independent of the political and administrative authorities is an essential
element of the Rechtsstaat. Only the judges can in conscience and complete freedom reprimand
the government and even force it to obey the law and redress injustice. A judiciary which is in
the hands of the government would turn the Rechtsstaat into a hypocritical farce.... [lI]n
seventeenth-century England the Magna Carta tradition finally won the day. One of the fruits of
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Constitution anticipates the pressures of war on law and establishes a
legal procedure by which Congress can work with the executive to
respond to security threats while maintaining respect for
constitutional principles.
Whether in response to a putative
suspension of habeas corpus or to the attempted introduction of
evidence acquired via torture, the courts have an indispensable part
to play in ensuring that the politically responsive branches remain
responsible to the law at all times. The courts must maintain the
availability and integrity of the judicial process as a means of
preserving Anglo-American constitutionalism in principle and in
practice.
This is another link between the decisions of the American and
English courts in Boumediene and the Belmarsh cases. The House of
Lords recognized in the Belmarsh cases that indefinite preventive
detention, evidence obtained by torture, and interference with habeas
corpus present, inescapably, threats to the integrity and independence
of the judiciary as an institution, and to the rule of law as a core
constitutional value of Anglo-American constitutional government.'
To preserve the nature of their institution and of their constitution,
judges are understood in the common law tradition to possess the
authority to disavow acts of the government that violate legal
principle. This disavowal is expressed in similar and different ways
and through similar and different concepts in England and the United
States: judicial review, habeas corpus, due process, abuse of process,
the Glorious Revolution was the Bill of Rights of 1689 and its logical conclusion, the Act of
Settlement of 1701, which proclaimed the independence of the judicature from the government.
The repercussions of these English developments on the American and European Constitutions
are well known ..."(footnote omitted)).
178. See A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't (No. 2) (Belmarsh I1)[2005] UKHL 71, [83]
(appeal taken from Eng.); A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't (Belmarsh 1) [2004] UKHL 56,
[36] (appeal taken from Eng.); see also Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law:
Jurisprudencefor the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1741-42 (2005) ("A third point
[regarding the use of torture by the state] addresses the issue of the rule of law-the enterprise of
subjecting 'the engines of state' to legal regulation and restraint. We hold ourselves committed to
a general and quite aggressive principle of legality, which means that law does not just have a
little sphere of its own in which to operate, but expands to govern and regulate every aspect of
official practice.... I think we should be concerned about the effect not just on American law
but on the rule of law of a weakening or an undermining of the legal prohibition on torture. We
have seen how the prohibition on torture operates as an archetype of various parts of American
constitutional law and law enforcement culture generally. I believe it also operates as an
archetype of the ideal we call the rule of law. That agents of the state are not permitted to torture
those who fall into their hands seems an elementary incident of the rule of law as it is understood
in the modern world. If this protection is not assured, then the prospects for the rule of law
generally look bleak indeed.").
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incompatibility declarations. But what unites the common law
tradition is the constitutional precommitment that the government
can only act by and under the law. And where the government acts
in a manner inconsistent with that constitutional norm, the judiciary's
independence incorporates its institutional obligation to the law.179
This brings us back to the idea that the judiciary and other branches
of government engage in a conversation with each other about the
meaning of the Constitution. In the constitutional democracies of the
common law world, the rule of government and the people according
to legal principles is thought to create and sustain the state. 8 ° The
state cannot exist outside the law and therefore cannot act outside the
8

law.' '
This substantive and structural principle-that certain
government acts are irretrievably inconsistent with the rule of law
and that common law courts are obliged to say so-unifies the
analysis of the various judicial opinions in Boumediene and the
Belmarsh cases. The House's decision in the Belmarsh cases, and
Justice Breyer's and Judge Rogers's opinions in Boumediene, protect
the judicial institution by asserting the judiciary's institutional
identity and constitutional responsibility to maintaining AngloAmerican rule of law values. Legislatures and executive officials
may act contrary to the rule of law, but this does not mean that the
courts must (or should) prescind from saying that they have done so,
explaining the nature of those violations, and taking their part in the
institutional conversation that helps to construct the principles of
their constitution.'82 Moreover, where legislative or executive acts
179. See David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the
Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005, 2035 (2006) ("[Ilf the executive is given the
equivalent of such a prerogative either by the constitution or by statute, it is the duty of judges to
try to understand that delegation of power as constrained by the rule of law. To the extent that the
delegation cannot be so understood, judges must treat it as, to use terminology developed by
Ronald Dworkin, an embedded mistake, that is, a fact which they have to recognize, but whose
force they should try to limit to the extent possible. They are entitled to do this because they
should adopt as a regulative assumption of their role the view that all the institutions of
government are cooperating in what we can think of as the rule of law project, the project which
tries to ensure that political power is always exercised within the limits of the rule of law."
(footnote omitted)).
180. See id. at 2008.
181. Seeid.at2010.
182. See id.at 2011 ("[Jludges [need not] always be the principal guardians of the rule of law.
Certain situations, and emergencies are one, might require that Parliament or the executive play
the lead role. The rule of law project does not require allegiance to a rigid doctrine of the
separation of powers in which judges are the exclusive guardians of the rule of law.
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threaten to undermine the integrity of the judicial process itself, the
courts' obligation to preserve their institution amounts to a
concomitant defense of constitutional values. The Supreme Court
articulated this point over seventy years ago, in a case where the
Court refused to countenance a conviction grounded on confessions
obtained by torture:
The state is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in
accordance with its own conceptions of policy, unless in so
doing it "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
But the freedom of the state in
fundamental."...
establishing its policy is the freedom of constitutional
government and is limited by the requirement of due
process of law. Because a state may dispense with a jury
trial, it does not follow that it may substitute trial by ordeal.
The rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the
witness stand ....

And the trial equally is a mere pretense

where the state authorities have contrived a conviction
resting solely upon confessions obtained by violence. The
due process clause requires "that state action, whether
through one agency or another, shall be consistent with the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions." It would be
difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense
of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of
these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus
obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a
clear denial of due process.
• . "Coercing the supposed state's criminals into
confessions and using such confessions so coerced from
them against them in trials has been the curse of all
countries. It was the chief iniquity, the crowning infamy of
the Star Chamber, and the Inquisition, and other similar
institutions. The Constitution recognized the evils that lay
behind these practices and prohibited them in this
Nevertheless, judges will always have some role in ensuring that the rule of law is maintained
even when the legislature and the executive are in fact cooperating in the project. Judges also
have an important role in calling public attention to a situation in which such cooperation wanes
or ceases.").
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of a person on trial for his life rises above mere rules of
procedure, and wherever the court is clearly satisfied that
such violations exist, it will refuse to sanction such
violations and will apply the corrective. '"83

Indeed, if the courts stood silently by in the face of government
acts that would, for all practical purposes, create a space in which
government could forgo any reference to or constraint of the law, this
would create what Lord Steyn called a "legal black hole." '84 A legal
black hole is irreconcilable with the rule of law, because rule of law
values mean at bottom that government action must always be
limited by law and a legal black hole is a condition or circumstance
in which government is empowered to act entirely outside the law.
For purposes of this Article, the most significant threat posed by
lawless government action is the implicit or (as the DTA and MCA
demonstrate) explicit tension between a legal black hole and the
constitutional judicial role. This tension troubled Lord Steyn in
relation to American and English courts:
The United States has a long and honourable
commitment to the Magna Carta and allegiance to the rule
of law. In recent times extraordinary deference of the
United States courts to the executive has undermined those
values and principles. As matters stand at present the
United States courts would refuse to hear a prisoner at
Guantanamo Bay who produces credible medical evidence
that he has been and is being tortured. They would refuse
to hear prisoners who assert that they were not combatants
at all. They would refuse to hear prisoners who assert that
they were simply soldiers in the Taliban army and knew
nothing about Al-Qaeda. They would refuse to examine
any complaints of any individuals. The blanket presidential
order deprives them all of any rights whatever. As a lawyer
183. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1936) (final alteration in original)

(citations omitted).
184. See Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1
(2004). The phrase actually has a longer history in English judicial opinions, but I want to restrict
its meaning to the context of this Article and the detainees in Guantanamo and Belmarsh. Even
with that limitation, however, the phrase appears in R (on the application ofAbbasi and another)
v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598, [22]
(Eng.).
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brought up to admire the ideals of American democracy and
justice, I would have to say that I regard this as a monstrous
failure of justice. 85
The point here is that the government cannot eliminate judicial
review as a means of attempting to insulate itself from accountability
to the law. And the courts cannot, and should not, allow their
authority and jurisdiction to be extirpated in this fashion. Legislation
and executive action that would compromise core elements of the
judicial institution-by denying all meaningful judicial review of
government acts in relation to detainees in Guantanamo or by
permitting evidence acquired through torture to rationalize detention
in Belmarsh-threatens to compromise the Anglo-American rule of
law tradition.
Here again the principle of abuse of process gains traction. The
legislative and executive organs of government may attempt to do
things with and through the law in detention facilities, but not in
courtrooms.
Where these acts conflict with the bedrock
constitutional principles of the Anglo-American common law
tradition itself, the courts have an obligation to those principles that
supersede any institutional habit of deference during times of crisis.
In other words, there are areas, such as military operations, in which
the courts will appropriately defer to the executive and the
legislature. But, there are no instances in which the courts will
utterly absent themselves from ensuring the legality of all
government action. That would amount to abdicating their own
independent institutional obligation to the rule of law as expressed in
the written and unwritten constitutions of the United States and the
United Kingdom. 86 Of course, the expression of that obligation
differs in the United States and United Kingdom. In the United
States, it takes the form of voiding the act as unconstitutional, and in
the United Kingdom it may take the form of a declaration of
But, these
incompatibility under the Human Rights Act.'87
differences are far less meaningful than the similar resistance in both
national judiciaries to exercises of political power that conflict with
185. Steyn, supra note 184, at 11.
186. See DYZENHAUS, supra note 120, at 212.
187.

See generally STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY

TO POLITICS 92-94 (1996)
exercised by the judiciary).

(describing four variations in constitutional authority that are
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constitutional principles or that would debase the judiciary as an
institution. The Anglo-American rule of law tradition means that
lawless government action is, by definition, contrary to the
constitutional values of the United States and the United Kingdom.'88
V. CONCLUSION

The dissenting opinions of Justice Breyer and Judge Rogers in
Boumediene and the majority's speeches in the Belmarsh cases
reflect the Anglo-American commitment to the rule of law and the
role of courts in ensuring that the government act only within and
according to constitutional principles. This commitment is revealed
in their discussions of habeas corpus and the jurisdiction to review
claims of constitutional violation by the government, and of abuse of
process and proportionality. This dedication to legalism and judicial
independence, evinced most plainly through the exercise of judicial
review, is intrinsic to the common law tradition. The legislature and
the executive can test and even alter the margins, under recognized
conditions, but the government cannot act as though there were no
margins whatsoever to circumscribe its political authority. The
commitment to the rule of law means that, in the end, it is law that
rules. And the government cannot act, or force the courts to act, in
violation of that basic principle.189 Boumediene and the Belmarsh
cases are, then, two recent efforts by American and English judges to
remind their governments of what their governments already know: a
188. The use of the term "lawless" in the previous sentence is quite deliberately intended to
encompass both of its common usages, i.e., the government cannot act contrary to, or in the
absence of, legal standards. Cf Waldron, supra note 178, at 1726-27, 1734-39, 1741-43.
189. See, e.g., T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE
OF LAW 251 (2001) ("[A]s a common law doctrine parliamentary sovereignty does not extend to
The principle that it is beyond legislative competence to
infringements of the rule of law ....
require a court to 'disregard both the law and the essential function of a court of law and do
whatever they considered to be desirable in the public interest' assumes that the 'law' cannot
itself be made merely a matter of 'the public interest'...." (footnote omitted) (quoting
Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth, (1991) 172 C.L.R. 501, 607)); Dyzenhaus, supra note 179, at
2011 ("As I will argue, it is in seeing that judges are but part of the rule of law project that one
can begin to appreciate the paradox that arises when rule by law, rule through a statute, is used to
do away with the rule of law, to create a legal black hole. I will claim that there is a contradiction
in the idea of legal black hole. In other words, one cannot have rule by law without the rule of
law. But precisely because I want to argue that judges are but part of the rule of law project, I
also am not committed to the conclusion that judges are always entitled to resist statutes that
create legal black holes. Whether they are so entitled will depend on the constitutional structure
of their legal order. But whatever that structure, they are under a duty to uphold the rule of
law.").
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nation cannot simultaneously protect itself and sacrifice its principles
without sacrificing the nation along with the principles.
I indicated in my discussion of the D.C. Circuit majority opinion
in Boumediene that this federal court had failed to address the matter
of statutory jurisdiction-stripping in the detainees' habeas case as it
related to more fundamental matters of judicial independence and
constitutionalism. Put differently, I indicated that the D.C. Circuit
had failed to maintain its institutional role in ensuring that the
government's actions are always evaluated in accordance with the
law of the United States and the Constitution. This is why I argued
that the D.C. Circuit was mistaken when it addressed the issues in
Boumediene almost entirely in the context of the Suspension Clause,
rather than at a more fundamental level of constitutional allocation of
institutional responsibility:
[T]he total preclusion of review in the DTA and MCA is
unconstitutional because it contravenes a broader postulate
of the constitutional structure of which the Suspension
Clause forms a part: that some court must always be open
to hear an individual's claim to possess a constitutional
right to judicial redress of a constitutional violation. That
principle applies whether the remedy sought is habeas
relief, an injunction against unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, or some other constitutionally required
remedy.
In the end, the individual's substantive
constitutional claim to the remedy requested may or may
not prevail, but the foreclosure of jurisdiction cannot, by
itself, bar all courts even from considering whether the
Constitution gives aliens detained in the United States a
right to judicial relief from ongoing violations of
constitutional rights involving conditions of confinement.'
The D.C. Circuit was correct to consider Congress's institutional
authority to respond to ongoing threats of terrorism in the postSeptember 11 world. But, the D.C. Circuit appeared to lose sight of
its own institutional responsibility to ensure that Congress exercise
its authority, at all times, in accordance with constitutional
limitations.

190. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 63, at 2063.

